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JUDA V. UNITED STATES: AN ATOLL'S LEGAL
ODYSSEY
James J. Whittle*
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after World War II, the United Nations and the United Na-
tions Trusteeship Council' gained authority over territories that were
not self-governed.2 The United Nations Charter established the Inter-
national Trusteeship System to encourage self-government and inde-
pendence for these territories.3 Prior to World War II, a League of
Nations mandate 4 gave Japan control over Micronesia, which includes
the Marshall Islands. 5 During World War II, however, the United
States assumed military control over Micronesia;6 the Marshall Islands
became a United States Trust Territory on April 2, 1947.7 A joint reso-
lution of the United States Congress, enacted on July 18, 1947, ac-
cepted the "Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Man-
* J.D. Candidate, 1990. Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 85; see id. (creating the United Nations Trusteeship Council
to assist the United Nations General Assembly to execute its functions concerning all
non-strategic trusts).
2. Id. arts. 75-85. The United Nations Charter establishes the international trustee-
ship system. Id.
3. Id. art. 76(b). Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter addresses the goals of
the International Trustee System. Id.; see Hirayasu, The Process of Self-Determina-
tion and Micronesia's Future Political Status Under International Lan', 9 U. HAw. L.
REV. 487, 494 (1987) (stating that article 76(b) requires an administering authority to
direct the trust territory towards self-government or independence). The expressed will
of the inhabitants, and territorial circumstances determine whether the emphasis is to-
ward self-government or independence. Id.
4. Mandate for the Former German Possessions in the Pacific Ocean Lying of the
Equator [Mandate for the Former German Possession], 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 87
(1921).
5. See generally Hirayasu, supra note 3, at 491-93 (examining the Japanese con-
trol of Micronesia under the League of Nations mandate). Micronesia is the collective
name for thousands of islands located in the western Pacific Ocean. See id. at 487
(stating that Micronesia includes more than 2100 islands). The Marshall Islands are
one of the three significant archipelagos that comprise Micronesia. Weisgall, Microne-
sia And The Nuclear Pacific Since Hiroshima, 5 SAIS REv. 41, 42 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Nuclear Pacific]. Bikini Atoll is one of the atolls located in the Marshall Islands.
Weisgall, The Nuclear Nomads Of Bikini, 39 FOREIGN POL'Y 74, 74 (1980).
6. Hirayasu, supra note 3, at 490.
7. S.C. REs. 21, 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 16 (1947); see Juda v. United
States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441, 444 (1984) [hereinafter Juda 1] (stating the United States was
recognized as the administering authority through an agreement of the United Nations
Security Council and approval of Congress).
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dated Islands" (Trusteeship Agreement). 8
The Trusteeship Agreement required the United States, as "adminis-
tering authority," 9 to protect the land, resources, and health of Micro-
nesia's inhabitants.' 0 Prior to the Trusteeship Agreement, however, and
later in violation of its obligations therein, the United States moved the
inhabitants of Bikini Atoll, 1 part of the Marshall Islands,' 2 and com-
menced nuclear weapons tests on July 1, 1946.13 Twelve years of bom-
bardment followed, causing enormous destruction to Bikini Atoll.' 4 The
tests vaporized several islands, gouged a mile long hole in the barrier
reef, contaminated the soil to a depth of two feet, and rendered the
Atoll uninhabitable. 5
The Bikinian plight did not end with the loss of the Atoll. After sev-
eral relocations,16 approximately fifty percent of the Bikinian popula-
tion remains in refuge on Kili Island. 7 In 1968, the Johnson adminis-
8. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665.
9. Id. art. 2, at 3303. Article two designates the United States of America as the
administering authority of the trust territory. Id.
10. Id. art. 6, §§ 2 & 3, at 3303, at 6. The language of the Trusteeship Agreement
expressly required the United States to protect the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands.
Id.
11. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 138 (defining an atoll as a
coral reef consisting of a chain of closely spaced coral islets surrounding a shallow
lagoon). An atoll may vary in diameter from less than a mile to 80 miles or more. Id.
12. Compare Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 443 (setting forth the claims of the inhabitants of
Bikini Atoll) with Peter v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 768 (1984) (setting forth the claims
of the people of the Enewetak, another Marshall Islands atoll). The inhabitants of
Enewetak were also moved in order to facilitate United States nuclear testing. See D.
MCHENRY, MICRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED 58 (1975) (explaining how the importance
of "Eniwetok" as an atomic testing site required the removal of its inhabitants).
13. To Approve The Compact Of Free Association: Hearings Before The Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 2d sess. 298, 304 (1984)
(statement of Jonathan M. Weisgall, Legal Counsel to the People of Bikini) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings].
14. Id. at 308.
15. Id. at 308-09; see Consolidated Brief of Appellants at 6, People of Bikini,
Enewetak, Rongelap, Utrik and Other Marshall Islands Atolls v. The United States,
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 88-1206, 88-1207, 88-1208) [hereinafter Consolidated Brief]
(asserting that at least three islands were vaporized); see also Comment, Bravo's Fall-
out: International Law and Nuclear Pollution in the Pacific, 14 N.C. CEN. L.J. 172,
184 (1983-1984) [hereinafter Bravo's Fallout] (explaining that complete restoration of
the Bikini Atoll is impossible). Several islands of the Atoll have vanished as a result of
the testing. Id. In addition, the destruction of part of the reef has allowed sharks to
enter the lagoon. Id.
16. See Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 447 (examining the numerous location of the Bikini-
ans); see also Sager, Paradise Lost, THE WASH. POST MAG., Aug. 23, 1987, at 14, 19
[hereinafter Paradise Lost] (referring to the short Bikinian stay on the Rongerik Atoll
and Kwajalein Island before being settled on Kili).
17. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 447. In 1985, approximately 650 Bikinians lived on Kili.
Maxa, Nuclear Nomads, WASHINGTONIAN, June 1985, at 123, 126 [hereinafter Nu-
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tration authorized a small resettlement of the Atoll.18 In 1978,
however, upon discovery of the continued existence of dangerous radia-
tion levels the United States government removed the repatriated in-
habitants. 9 On March 16, 1981, after 35 years of exile, the Bikinians
filed suit in the United States Court of Claims.20 On October 1, 1982,
pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act,21 the case, Juda v.
United States (Juda 1) was transferred to the newly created United
States Claims Court.22 The complaint focused on two alternate takings
clause theories and on allegations of breach of an implied-in-fact
contract.23
The Claims Court suspended the case until April 1983, to prevent
interference with negotiations between the United States and the nas-
cent Republic of the Marshall Islands.2 After lifting the suspension,
the Claims Court rejected the government's motion to dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction on October 5, 1984.21 Subsequent to this deci-
sion, however, the United States government and the Republic of the
Marshall Islands finalized a Compact of Free Association (Compact).20
Because of the new Compact, the Claims Court granted an amended
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on November
10, 1987.27 The court held that the Compact implicitly amended the
Tucker Act28 that vests the United States Claims Court with jurisdic-
clear Nomads]. In 1985, 200 Bikinians lived on Ejit. Id. The remaining 410 Bikinians
were scattered throughout the Marshall Islands. Id.
18. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 447.
19. Id. at 447-48.
20. Id. at 443, 446.
21. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982).
22. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 444.
23. Id. at 449.
24. Juda v. United States, 13 CI. Ct. 667 (1987), appeal dismissed, People of Bi-
kini, 859 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1988), affd sub nora., People of Enewetak v. United
States, 864 F.2d 134 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, No. 88-1466 (U.S. June 19, 1989)
(WESTLAW, SCT database, 1989 WL 66054) [hereinafter Juda I1].
25. Id. at 458. The factual allegations of the December 21, 1981 amended com-
plaint are taken as true for purposes of the government motion to dismiss. Id. at 446;
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
26. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770
(1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986); see Hills, Compact of Free
Association for Micronesia: Constitutional and International Law Issues, 18 INT'L
LAw. 583, 584-602 (1984) (elaborating various government viewpoints on the legal
issues surrounding the Compact).
27. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 690.
28. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982). The Tucker Act vests the United
States Claims Court with jurisdiction over claims based on the Constitution, an Act of
Congress, an Executive Regulation, or any express or implied contract with the United
States. Id. The Claims Court has reiterated the same elements for its jurisdiction.
Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 361, 369 (1988); Juda I, 6
Cl. Ct. at 453; Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. United States, 2 Ci. Ct. 380, 383 (1983).
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tion. As a consequence, the court found that the United States had
withdrawn its consent to be sued on these issues.29
The legacy of American nuclear testing requires immediate action in
order to fulfill the goals enumerated in the Trusteeship Agreement. 0
This case-comment examines the efforts of the Bikinians to obtain ade-
quate compensation for their forty year odyssey and analyzes the im-
pact of the Claims Court decision in Juda v. United States (Juda 11)81
on these endeavors. As indicated in the preceding parenthetical, there
are two related Claims Court decisions bearing the name Juda.32 The
legal analysis of the Juda II decision is the primary concern of this
case-comment.3 3 Some of the legal issues and factual circumstances of
Juda I, however, will be discussed.3 4 Part I focuses on the factual cir-
cumstances that gave rise to the Bikinian claims. Part II reviews the
legal background of Juda I and Juda 11,31 including the Trusteeship
Agreement, the Bikinian claims, and the Compact of Free Association.
Part III summarizes the Claims Court analysis in Juda 11.36 Part IV
examines the Claims Court legal analysis in Juda II, that the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted,37 and upon which the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.38 In addition, Part IV consid-
ers alternative interpretations of the applicable law. Part V presents
alternatives to the dismissal of the case and explores the potential for
settlement of all claims arising from United States nuclear testing.
I. THE FACTS OF JUDA V. UNITED STATES
On March 16, 1981, the dispossessed Bikinian community filed suit
against the United States government.39 Two international agree-
29. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 690.
30. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, art. 6, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 3.
31. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 667.
32. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 441; Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 667. The first official report of
the case, Juda 1, held that the Bikinians had cognizable claims under the Tucker Act
and denied the government's motion to dismiss. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 458. In Juda If,
the Claims Court held that the Compact of Free Association amended the Tucker Act,
thereby, removing the consent of the United States to be sued. Juda H, 13 Cl. Ct. at
690.
33. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 667.
34. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 441.
35. Id.; Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 667.
36. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 667.
37. People of Enewetak v. United States, 864 F.2d 134 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
38. People of Enewetak v. United States, No. 88-1466 (U.S. June 19, 1989)
(WESTLAW, SCT database, 1989 WL 66054).
39. Juda/ , 6 Cl. Ct. at 446.
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ments,40 numerous motions,41 and several claims exhibit the compli-
cated factual circumstances relating to the Bikinians 2 These factual
issues can be divided into two historic periods: first, mandate to trustee-
ship and exile, and, second, Bikinian claims and the Compact.
A. FROM MANDATE TO TRUSTEESHIP AND EXILE
1. From Japanese Mandate to American Testing Site
After World War I, a League of Nations mandate granted Japan
control of Micronesia. 43 As a result of World War II, the relationship
between Japan and the United States toward Micronesia changed. At
the end of World War II, the United States controlled the area." Little
doubt existed that the United States would remain in control. During
the early post-war period, however, considerable debate among the
leaders of the United States focused on whether to annex Micronesia or
40. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665; Compact of Free Association Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681) (West Supp.
1986)).
41. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 669-70; see id. (discussing the defendant's numerous
motions to dismiss).
42. See Id. at 668-70 (examining the involved background of this case). The fac-
tual circumstances and legal arguments of the Bikinian case can be contrasted with
those of two related cases. Compare Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 452, 458 (holding that both
the takings clause and implied-in-fact contract claims were within the jurisdiction of
the court) with Peter v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 768, 779 (1984) (holding that the
inhabitants of Enewetak Atoll, moved for the purpose of nuclear testing, had stated a
breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim within the Tucker Act jurisdiction of the
court) and Nitol v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 405, 414-15 (1985) (holding that citizens
of the Marshall Islands possessing various ownership rights of the several islands con-
taminated with nuclear fallout, stated takings clause claims within the Tucker Act ju-
risdiction of the court).
43. Mandate for the Former German Possessions, supra note 4, at 87; see
Hirayasu, supra note 3, at 490 (stating that Japan gained political control over Micro-
nesia, including the Marshall Islands); see also T. YANAIHARA, PACIFIC ISLANDS
UNDER JAPANESE MANDATE 259-66 (1940) (examining the Japanese administration of
Micronesia under the League of Nations mandate).
During this period, Japan administered Micronesia as a Class C Mandate. Hirayasu,
supra note 3, at 493. Class C mandates were intended to be administered as integral
parts of the administering power's territory. This type of administration was tacitly
accepted with the manning of Japanese troops on Bikini. Paradise Lost, supra note 16,
at 14. See generally, R. CHOWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS
SYSTEMS; A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1955) (examining and comparing the mandate and
trusteeship systems).
44. Hirayasu, supra note 3, at 490; see Nuclear Nomads, supra note 17, at 75
(stating that the Bikinians have effectively become wards of the United States).
45. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 671; Plaintiffs' Response To Defendant's Additional
Brief Of Issues Posed By The Court, at 3, Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667 (No.
172-81L) (1987) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Response].
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place it under the international administration of the United Nations.4"
During the same period, the Atomic Energy Commission advocated, as
did others, continued nuclear testing. 7 The continuation of nuclear
testing necessitated a suitable site.4 8 The Joint Chiefs of Staff consid-
ered an optimal site to provide minimal hazard and a low risk of con-
tamination to the United States. 49 The United States chose Bikini be-
cause it met this standard.50
The United States promptly instructed the Bikinians to leave their
atoll.51 On March 7, 1946, the United States moved the 167 inhabi-
46. Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 42; see id. (examining the post-World War II
debate between military and diplomatic leaders over the future status of Micronesia
and the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter). The debate consisted of both
moral and emotional appeals. Id. Admiral Ernest King expressed his support for annex-
ation because "These atolls, these island harbors will have been paid for by the sacri-
fice of American blood." N.Y. Times, April 5, 1945, at 4. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, on the other hand, based his support of no territorial aggrandizement and the
establishment of an international trusteeship system on the principles of the Atlantic
Charter and the Cairo Declaration. Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 42-43. The
United Nations resolved this disagreement with the establishment of a trusteeship sys-
tem. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 671. The Atlantic Charter principles provided a framework
to help the United Nations in creating the trusteeship system. Hills, supra note 26, at
589.
United States lobbying in the interest of national security directly resulted in the
division of the trust territories into strategic and nonstrategic. Id. Security Council
supervision, combined with a veto to protect American interests, allowed the United
States to exercise effective control over the Micronesian trusteeship, and, thus, elimi-
nate the need for annexation. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 12, at 5-6 (asserting that
the strategic trust designation allowed the United States absolute control over Microne-
sia). The strategic trust for Micronesia was the only one ever created. Id. Furthermore,
this trust was the only instance the United States assumed responsibility for a foreign
territory under an international organization. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 671.
47. Hearings, supra note 13, at 301. In 1948, the Commission indicated its opinion
that American preeminence in nuclear weapons required observation of full scale tests.
Id. The highly destructive nature of nuclear weapons easily explains the desire of the
United States for preeminence in this field. Cf. Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 41(explaining that in a period of three days the United States brought a swift end to the
Pacific War through the use of two nuclear weapons against Japan).
48. Hearings, supra note 13, at 302; see Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 446-47 (noting that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed a committee to plan a series of atomic tests and to
choose the site for the tests).
49. W. SHURCLIFF, BOMBS AT BIKINI: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPERATION
CROSSROADS 15 (1947). To avoid potential contamination to the United States, the site
had to be located a considerable distance from the United States, with little or no
population and a relatively stable climate. Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 43. Fur-
thermore, the site needed a waterway suitable for anchoring target ships. Id.
50. Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 43. The choice of Bikini took only sixty days.
Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 446-47.
51. Id. at 447; Cf. Paradise Lost, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing some of the
conversations that transpired between military officials and the Bikinians). On Sunday,
February 10, 1946, Commodore Ben Wyatt, the American military governor of the
Marshall Islands, compared the Bikinians to the children of Israel, informed them on
the power of the atomic bomb, and generally extolled the intent of the American scien-
660 [VOL. 4:655
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tants of Bikini to the Rongerik Atoll. 2 The first United States nuclear
test at Bikini took place on July 1, 1946.53 Twelve years of nuclear
weapons use in the Marshall Islands followed, making the move off the
Atoll indefinite. 4
2. American Strategic Trust Over Micronesia and Bikinian Exile
After the World War II, the United Nations was given sole responsi-
bility for granting all international trusteeships under the International
Trusteeship System.5 A trusteeship agreement under the International
Trusteeship System must be implemented pursuant to Article 79 of the
United Nations Charter (Charter).5 6 Article 79 requires that the par-
ticipating countries agree to all of the terms of the trusteeship and that
trusteeship approval comply with pertinent articles of the Charter.0  In
addition, the Charter requires that the Security Council exercise all
United Nations functions concerning strategic trusts.', A trust territory
is considered strategic primarily due to security concerns., 9 On April 2,
1947, the Security Council granted Micronesia, a territory qualifying
under the United Nations Charter, 0 to the United States as a strategic
tists. Weisgall, supra note 5, at 77. Surrounded with images of United States power
and wealth the Bikinians agreed to sacrifice their Atoll for mankind. Id. Jonathan
Weisgall, counsel for the Bikinians, noted, however, that the Bikinian decision resulted
less from naivety than awe of the United States victory over Japan. Id.
52. See Weisgall, supra note 5, at 80 (explaining the significant differences be-
tween Bikini and Rongerik). Rongerik has seventy-five percent less land than Bikini.
inferior coconut palms, and toxic fish. Id. Near starvation conditions prevailed on
Rongerik. Id.
53. Paradise Lost, supra note 16, at 14.
54. Id. The Bikinians have been unable to permanently return home over the past
forty-three years, despite the fact that nuclear testing terminated over thirty years ago
in 1958. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 446-47.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 75. Chapter XII of the Charter establishes the Interna-
tional Trusteeship System. Id. arts. 75-85.
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 79.
57. Id. Article 79 requires compliance with Articles 83 and 85 of the Charter. Id.
58. Id. art. 83.
59. R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 43, at 11. It was not surprising that the United
States considered Micronesia a security risk because Japan had used it as a staging
ground for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 41. Moreover,
Admiral Nimitz maintained that United States security ultimately depended on con-
trolling the Pacific Ocean and particularly Micronesia. R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 43,
at 119-20 (quoting THE FORRESTAL DIARIEs 214 (1951)).
60. Id. art. 77. A trusteeship agreement applied to territories: (1) held in mandate;
(2) detached from enemy states due to World War II; or (3) placed voluntarily under
the trusteeship system. Id. As a consequence of World War I, Japan gained control
over Micronesia under a League of Nations mandate. Mandate for the Former German
Possessions, supra note 2, at 87. As a result of World War II, Micronesia was detached
from Japan. Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 42.
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trust.6' Congressional approval of the trusteeship on July 18, 1947, a
year after the first nuclear test on Bikini, bound the United States to
the terms of the agreement while formally making the Marshall Islands
part of a United Nations trusteeship.62
Article 4 of the Trusteeship Agreement assigned several require-
ments to the United States. 3 The United States must act in accor-
dance with the United Nations Charter, the objectives of the Interna-
tional Trusteeship System, and the provisions of the Trusteeship
Agreement.64 In addition, Article 6 requires the United States to pro-
tect the lands, resources, and health of the inhabitants.6 5 Through Con-
gressional and Presidential approval of these requirements the Trustee-
ship Agreement received the weight of domestic law. 6
Unfortunately, however, years of American guardianship, pursuant
to the Trusteeship Agreement, negatively affected the Bikinians. 7 On
July 22, 1958, the final nuclear weapon test on Bikini Atoll took
61. S.C. RES. 21, 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 16 (1947); see U.N. CHARTER art.
82 (allowing the establishment of a strategic area or areas within part or all of a trust
territory).
62. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665; see Hills, supra note 26, at 589-92 (discussing
the political background of the Trusteeship System and the Micronesian Trust).
63. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, art. 4, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id. art. 6, §§ 2 & 3 at 3302-03; see Bravo's Fallout, supra note 15, at 186
(explaining that land is the basis of Micronesian culture, and that its alienation is next
to impossible). The creation of a "fee simple subject to radiation subsequent" appears
to be one of a few ways to acquire land in Micronesia, where torturous negotiations and
extensive litigation are the norm. Id.
66. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665.
67. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 668; see id. (stating that in 1981 and 1982, 5,000 inhabi-
tants of the Marshall Islands filed petitions claiming damages from the United States
nuclear testing program). Some benefits have resulted, however, from United States
control over the Micronesian Trust. Hills, supra note 26, at 583. The trusteeship has
fostered Micronesian self-government, resulting in the division of the trust into various
political entities; the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau. Id.
The nuclear testing program saved the United States billions of dollars in defense
spending and incorporated atomic energy as a crucial element of defense planning.
Hearings, supra note 13, at 305-07. Reflecting upon the success of the Alamogordo
nuclear test, Winston Churchill concluded that the atomic bomb effectively counter-
acted Russian superiority. Id. at 300 (quoting A. BRYANT, TRIUMPH IN THE WEST:
BASED ON THE PERSONAL DIARIES OF FIELD MARSHALL LORD ALAN BROOKE 363-64(1959)); see Hills, supra note 26, at 585 n.10 (explaining that the relocation of various
inhabitants of the Marshall Islands is minimized in light of the millions displaced dur-
ing World War II and its value to international security). But see Bravo's Fallout,
supra note 15, at 189-90 (acknowledging that, although many benefits resulted from
the testing, the Marshallese bore a disproportionate share of the costs of those
benefits).
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place.6 8 The atomic testing of the previous twelve years caused enor-
mous destruction. 9 The testing completely destroyed several islands. 0
An underwater test in 1946 deposited 500,000 tons of radioactive mud
on the lagoon floor.71 The greatest damage, however, resulted from the
Bravo hydrogen bomb test on March 1, 1954.72 This weapon 3
vaporized the test island, parts of other islands,T and tore a mile-wide
hole in the barrier reef.75 Absent this destructive hydrogen bomb test,
it is likely that the Bikinians would have returned to their native
island.7 6
B. CLAIMS, COMPAcT, DISMISSAL
1. The Bikinian Claims
The Bikinians were not beneficiaries of the Trusteeship.77 The
Bikinian plight deteriorated after the United States removed them
from Bikini to Rongerik Atoll in 1946. Unable to support themselves
on the scarce and toxic resources of the Rongerik Atoll, it was neces-
68. Compare Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 447 (stating that twenty-three nuclear weapons
tests occurred at Bikini from June 30, 1946 to July 22, 1958), with Peter v. United
States, 6 Cl. Ct. 768, 771 (1984) (explaining that from April 1948 to August 1958,
Enewetak Atoll was the site of forty-three atomic tests). The factual circumstances of
testing on Enewetak are similar to those of Bikini. Id. at 770-73. The one major dis-
tinction, however, is that from May 1977 to April 1980, the United States undertook a
radiological clean-up of Enewetak allowing the Enewetak people to return home. Id. at
773. Unfortunately, however, the Enewetak people are restricted to the southern is-
lands because several of the northern islands remain uninhabitable. Consolidated Brief,
supra note 15, at 7.
69. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 447.
70. Id.
71. Bravo's Fallout, supra note 15, at 183. In 1947, scientists discovered that the
once clear waters were almost opaque. Bravo's Fallout, supra note 15, at 183.
72. Hearings, supra note 13, at 308.
73. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 307-09 (recounting the background to
America's first hydrogen bomb test). Apparently, the Atomic Energy Commission did
not test this new weapon on the continental United States because of its potentially
grave risk. Id. at 307. This weapon had the explosive force of a 1000 Hiroshima bombs.
Id.
74. Paradise Lost, supra note 16, at 14, 19. The fireball of this hydrogen bomb test
was visible for a minute on the Rongerik Atoll, located 125 miles from Bikini. Hear-
ings, supra note 13, at 309.
75. Hearings, supra note 13, at 308; see also D. McHENRY, supra note 12, at 59
(explaining that the destruction of the reef has allowed sharks to enter the sheltered
fishing areas).
76. Paradise Lost, supra note 16, at 19.
77. Id. Starvation, abandonment of their boats to subsist on dollars, and several
relocations resulting in the Bikinians being scattered throughout the Pacific, have
eroded their culture. Id.
78. Trumbull, An Island People Still Exiled by Nuclear Age, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Oct. 18, 1982, 48, 49 [hereinafter Exiled by Nuclear Age].
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sary for the United States to move the Bikinians to the Kwajalein At-
oll.7 9 After their temporary stay on Kwajalein Atoll, the Bikinians were
relocated to Kili Island in September 1948.80 Since this time, Kili has
remained the Bikinians' primary refuge.81
Kili, however, is an inhospitable place.82 Tiny, compared to Bikini,
Kili has no lagoon, sheltered fishing area, or protected anchorage.8 3 In
1968, President Johnson announced that the Bikinians could return to
Bikini because the Atomic Energy Committee had concluded that the
island was safe for habitation.84 As a result, many Bikinians relocated
to Bikini Atoll despite the health risks.85 By the early 1970's, approxi-
mately 150 Bikinians had returned to their islands.86
For several years Bikinians once again lived on the atoll. In 1978,
however, the United States government conducted several radiological
studies of Bikini.87 The studies concluded that the Bikinians probably
ingested the greatest amount of radiation of any population in history 88
Once again, the United States removed the Bikinians and relocated
them to Ejit Island and Kili.89
79. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 6.
80. Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 44.
81. Hearings, supra note 13, at 291; see Nuclear Nomads, supra note 17, at 175
(stating that 200 Bikinians also live on Ejit Island).
82. See infra note 83 (describing Kili Island).
83. Weisgall, supra note 5, at 82. Kili is located 475 miles south of Bikini. D.
MCHENRY, supra note 12, at 58. Inaccessible by boat five months a year because of
pounding surf, Kili is a 200 acre speck of land in the middle of the Pacific. Nuclear
Nomads, supra note 17, at 175. Unaccustomed to struggling with the surf for fish,
Bikinians have become increasingly dependant on outside assistance. D. McHENRY,
supra note 12, at 58.
Dependance and boredom characterize the Bikinian experience on Kili. Paradise
Lost, supra note 16, at 19. Cans of United States salmon, Coke bottles, Pampers, and
trash accumulate on the shore. Id. Sailing for pleasure or subsistence is no longer possi-
ble. Id. On Kili, the children's previous cultural learning process is replaced with bil-
liards, basketball, Casio organs, videos, rock music, and cars. Id. The Bikinian boredom
and dependency can be summed up in one word, Jumbo. Id. Jumbo is the favorite
pastime of Kili's temporary inhabitants. Id. It consists of four 2.5 mile car trips on the
perimeter road for one U.S. dollar. Id. Jumbo allows the Bikinians to forget time and
pain, while dreaming of going home. Id. Bikinians rely on United States food, fuel, and
medicine for survival. Nuclear Nomads, supra note 17, at 175. In essence, the Bikini-
ans are "wards of the United States." Weisgall, supra note 5, at 75.
84. Hearings, supra note 13, at 315.
85. Id.
86. Consolidated Brief of Appellee at 5, People of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap,
Utrik and other Marshall Islands Atolls v. United States, (Fed. Cir. 4/15/88) (Nos.
88-1206, 88-1207, 88-1208) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
87. Exiled by Nuclear Age, supra note 78, at 49; see Weisgall, supra note 5, at 88
(stating that a radiological survey was conducted as part of a settlement to a suit
brought in 1975).
88. Appellee's Brief, supra note 86, at 5; Weisgall, supra note 5, at 89-90.
89. Weisgall, supra note 5, at 90. Bikini has remained uninhabited since 1978. Id.
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On March 16, 1981, after thirty-five years of exile, near starvation,
three relocations, and one aborted return, the Bikinians filed suit in the
United States Court of Claims.90 The court suspended Juda I to avoid
interfering with negotiations between the United States and the Repub-
lic of the Marshall Islands for the Compact of Free Association (Com-
pact).91 The Claims Court rejected the political question argument of
the United States and reinstated the proceedings on April 13, 1983.02
The United States argued that the statute of limitations had expired.93
The United States also asserted that the court did not have jurisdiction
over the contract and takings issues. 4 On October 5, 1984, the Claims
90. Juda 1, 6 CI. Ct. at 446. This case was transferred to the United States Claims
Court on October 1, 1982, in accordance with section 403(d) of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982); Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 444; see
Miller, The New United States Claims Court, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 7, 7-13 (1983-84)
(discussing the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 and the jurisdiction of the
Claims Court); see also infra notes 136-57 and accompanying text (discussing the
Bikinian claims).
91. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 445. All fourteen cases the Marshallese brought that arose
from the United States nuclear testing program were suspended to prevent interference
with the Compact negotiations. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 669. Eventually, the Compact
was finalized in 1986. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239,
99 Stat. 1770 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). The Compact
is an international agreement seeking to replace the Trusteeship Agreement while com-
prehensively redefining the relations between the two nations. Appellee's Brief, supra
note 86, at 2. See generally Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)) (recount-
ing the two nations' actions leading to the enactment of the Compact). The Compact
enables the United States to retain authority over Micronesian security and defense.
Nuclear Pacific, supra note 5, at 49. The new Micronesian states, however, may en-
gage in self-government and foreign affairs as long as compliance with United States
defense responsibilities occurs. Id.
92. See Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 3 (asserting that the court rejected
the political question contention of the government because money claims were the
"grist of judicial mills"). But see Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 446 (stating that the political
question and espousal issues were not decided because these issues were not fully
briefed and Compact ratification had not run its course). At this time, the United
States reserved the right to raise these issues if a change in facts made their disposition
feasible. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 669. Oral argument was heard on the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss on August 2, 1983. Id.
93. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 450; see 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1982) (stating that there is a
six year statute of limitations on claims falling within the jurisdiction of the Claims
Court).
94. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 452. The government argued, first, that all of the claims
were based in tort, and, second, that an implied-in-fact contract trust obligation did not
exist because the United States acted as a sovereign. Id. The government contended
that the contract claim was not within the Tucker Act. Id; see also Tucker Act. 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (1982) (describing the contract jurisdiction of the Claims Court).
The court has jurisdiction over cases involving any express or implied contract with the
United States or liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not based in tort. 1i.
Furthermore, the government argued that the fifth amendment to the United StatLc
Constitution did not apply because Congress had not passed an enabling act extending
the Constitution to the Marshall Islands. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 445; see Tucker Act. ?X
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Court denied the United States government's motions to dismiss and
held that the claims were not time barred.95
The court rejected the statute of limitation arguments of the United
States on all of the claims. 96 In considering the takings clause claims,
the court held that the removal of the Bikinians from Bikini in 1978
constituted a new and separate taking for purposes of the statute of
limitations.97 The court also explained that the statute of limitations is
inapplicable on the implied-in-fact contract claim because numerous
breaches occurred after the termination date of March 16, 1975.11
The Claims Court held that it had jurisdiction over the Bikinian
claims.99 The court applied the United States Bill of Rights1 00 to the
Bikinians, thereby, upholding their takings clause claims.101 In addi-
tion, the United States government's broad attack on the breach of
implied-in-fact contract claim did not persuade the court to dismiss this
Bikinian claim.102 The court found that the facts demonstrated ele-
ments of a contract claim, not a tort claim.10 3 The court concluded
that: first, sovereign immunity remained waived pursuant to the Tucker
Act;104 second, as an express contract involving different parties, the
Trusteeship Agreement, did not preempt the implied-in-fact con-
tract;10 5 and, third, that the sovereign act defense was not applicable.100
The court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the United States
to submit its answer to the causes of action in the complaint.10 7
U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (1982) (granting jurisdiction to the Claims Court for claims
against the United States based on the Constitution). Moreover, under the Tucker Act,
claims can be based upon any act of Congress, or executive regulation. Id.
95. Juda I, 6 Ci. Ct. at 458.
96. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 450-51.
97. Id. at 450; see 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1982) (declaring a six year statute of limita-
tions for Claims Court cases). If the removal of August 1978, from Bikini was a new
taking, then the plaintiffs' had until July 31, 1984 to file their claims. Id. Plaintiff's
filed their claim on March 16, 1981, thereby, meeting the requirements of the statute
of limitations. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 449.
98. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 451.
99. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 669.
100. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I-X.
101. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 458. The court noted that the United States had granted
benefits to the Bikinians that a foreign citizen could not achieve, tacitly extending the
Bill of Rights to the Bikinians. Id.; Cf. Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583, 591 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) cert. denied 420 U.S. 1004 (1975) (indicating that the takings clause applies
to territories upon a showing that the United States has unlawfully taken the land).
102. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 451-55; see id. (examining and rejecting the various de-
fenses of the government).
103. Id. at 451-53.
104. Id.
105. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 454.
106. Id. at 454-55.
107. Id. at 458.
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2. Developments With the Compact
While the case proceeded, developments on the Compact of Free
Association continued unabated.108 After the United States and the Re-
public of the Marshall Islands signed the Compact and the requisite
Marshall Islands plebiscite ratified it,108 the Reagan administration
submitted it to Congress on March 30, 1984.110 On January 14, 1986,
following extensive congressional action, President Reagan signed the
final version of the Compact.' Subsequently, the United States filed a
motion to dismiss the Bikinian case, asserting that the complaint raised
a non-justiciable political question.112 Later, the United States filed an
amended motion to dismiss, arguing that the Compact deprived the
court of its subject matter jurisdiction. 1 At the close of arguments,
the court ordered the parties to submit briefs on two issues:114 first,
whether the Compact and the Section 177 Agreement, for execution of
the nuclear testing claims settlement 1 5 were in effect and operative;11 6
and, second, whether Congress had effectively withdrawn the consent
108. Hills, supra note 26, at 584; see Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 673 (examining devel-
opments of the Compact).
109. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, §§ 411, 412,
99 Stat. 1770, 1827 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)); Sections
411 and 412 of the Compact required approval of the Marshall Islands plebiscite to
make the Compact effective. Id. Fifty-eight percent of the Marshall Islands plebiscite
voted in favor of the Compact. Hirayasu, supra note 3, at 508. Ninety percent of the
Bikinians, however, voted against the Compact. Hearings, supra note 13, at 288 (state-
ment of Jonathan M. Weisgall, Counsel on behalf of the People of Bikini). The Bikini-
ans felt that the Compact, primarily the Section 177 Agreement, inadequately ad-
dressed their claims. Id.
110. Hills, supra note 26, at 584.
111. Juda II, 13 C1. Ct. at 673.
112. Id. at 669; Appellee's Brief, supra note 86, at 4.
113. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 670; The United States argued that the Section 177
Agreement of the Compact of Free Association removed the Claim Court's jurisdiction.
Id. Pursuant to section 177 of the Compact, the two governments negotiated a separate
agreement. "Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Govern-
ment of the Marshall Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of
Free Association," reprinted in THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR MI-
CRONESIAN STATUS NEGOTIATIONS, COMPILATION OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE FREELY ASSOCIATED STATE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS at 1 (1987) [hereinafter Section 177 Agree-
ment]. The agreement was to act as the final settlement of all Marshallese claims re-
sulting from nuclear testing. Id. Oral argument on these issues was held on April 23,
1987. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 670.
114. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 670.
115. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, at 1. A final settlement of all claims
of the Marshallese required the execution of an agreement. Compact of Free Associa-
tion Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 177, 99 Stat. 1770, 1812 (1986) (codified at
48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
116. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 670.
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of the United States to be sued in the United States Claims Court for
these claims.11
On November 10, 1987, the Claims Court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 81 In a memo-
randum of decision, the court held that the Section 177 Agreement
implicitly amended the Tucker Act jurisdiction of the court." 9 This
conclusion effectively removed consent of the United States to be sued
on the Bikinian claims.'20
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND TO JUDA
The legal issues in Juda JJ121 result from tension between two dis-
tinct international agreements: the Trusteeship Agreement and the
Compact. This tension gave rise to the Bikinian claims against the
United States.12  The Trusteeship Agreement established a trusteeship
for the former Japanese Mandated Islands that came under American
administration during World War 11.123 The United States and several
Micronesian states entered into the Compact to terminate the trustee-
ship and establish greater sovereignty and self-determination. 24
A. THE TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT
The strategic trust created for Micronesia is the only binding agree-
ment in which the United States assumed responsibility for a foreign
117. Id.; Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 4-5. A full settlement of the
Bikinian's claims required an effective Section 177 Agreement combined with congres-
sional intent to withdraw the consent of the United States to be sued. Juda II, 13 Cl.
Ct. at 683. If this combination occurs, it effectively removes the jurisdiction of the
court over these claims. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982) (granting United
States consent to be sued on a number of issues).
118. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 670.
119. Id. at 690.
120. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 690; Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 5; Appellee's
Brief supra note 86, at 4; see Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. X, at 12
(stating the termination of all claims arising from the United States nuclear testing
program). All pending cases were dismissed and no court of the United States was
given jurisdiction to entertain these claims. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113,
art. XII, at 13.
121. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 667.
122. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 443-44; Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 668-69.
123. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665.
124. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770
(1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)); Hirayasu, supra note 3, at
498; see Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 170
(1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)) (stating that the govern.
ments of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands
have approved the Compact).
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territory under the supervision of an international organization. 2 The
Trusteeship Agreement that the United States and the United Nations
Security Council entered into dictated the rights and responsibilities of
the United States as "administering authority." 126 According to the
agreement, the United States must comply not only with the provisions
therein, but also with the United Nations Charter and the objectives of
the International Trusteeship System.12 Applicability of the Compact
and its Section 177 Agreement directly relate to the termination of the
Trusteeship Agreement. 12 8 The plaintiffs asserted that the Compact is
ineffective until the Security Council terminates the Trusteeship Agree-
125. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 671. The Micronesian Trust was the only strategic trust
ever created. Hirayasu, supra note 3, at 487. Furthermore, it was also the last remain-
ing trust territory. Id.
126. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, arts. 2-6, 61 Stat. 3301-03, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 2-3; see Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at
671 (stating that the agreement is a treaty between the United States and the United
Nations Security Council, similar to a bilateral contract). But see H. NIcHOLAS, THE
UNITED NATIONS: As A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 152 (5th ed. 1981) (asserting that the
agreement is not between the administering power and the United Nations, but among
the states directly concerned). A treaty is similar to a contract. Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). Over a hundred years ago the Supreme Court recognized
that treaties were contracts between nations. Id.
The trusteeship agreement has been recognized as a treaty. Peter v. United States, 6
Cl. Ct. 768, 779 (1984). The United States Constitution provides that treaties made
under United States authority are the supreme law of the land and binding on the
courts. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
In keeping with the political question doctrine established in Baker v. Carr, policy
considerations reflected in a treaty are beyond court review. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962). Interpreting international treaties and enforcing the domestic rights
they create, however, is the domain of the judiciary. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 113.1 (1986); see United States v. Decker,
600 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979) (citing numerous Su-
preme Court precedents for this proposition). The final authority for interpreting the
applicability of an international agreement for domestic law purposes rests with the
courts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
325.2 (1986).
127. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, art. 4, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 2; see U.N. CHARTER, arts. 75-
85 (establishing the international trusteeship system). Chapter XII (articles 75-85)
enumerates the objectives of the trusteeship system and the territories to which it is
applicable. Id. The Trusteeship Agreement requirement and the function of the Secur-
ity Council respecting strategic trusts are also set forth in Chapter XII. Id. Article 83
establishes the preeminence of the Security Council over strategic trusteeship agree-
ments and their amendment or alteration. Id. art. 83. This is extremely important in
determining the effectiveness of a trusteeship. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 678-79.
128. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 678; see id. (arguing that the Compact is not currently
in force). All the parties in Juda II recognized that the political status of free associa-
tion and the protective relationship of the trusteeship are inconsistent and mutually
exclusive. Id. at 677-78. The court had to decide whether the United States could ter-
minate the Trusteeship Agreement unilaterally. Id. at 678.
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ment."9 Consequently, the Claims Court examined the applicable
United Nations Charter provisions extensively. 130
The United Nations Charter provides the international guidelines for
trusteeships."'3 Article 79 of the Charter prescribes that all states "di-
rectly concerned" with the Trusteeship Agreement must approve the
agreement and all amendments. 32 Under Article 83, the Security
Council has jurisdiction over all strategic trusts,' 33 including the power
to terminate them.14 Before proceeding to an examination of the Com-
pact's legal impact on the trusteeship, however, it is necessary to dis-
cuss the Bikinian claims."'
B. BIKINIAN CLAIMS
1. Implied-in-Fact Contract
The Bikinians claim 36 that the United States breached its fiduciary
obligations under an implied-in-fact contract created in 1946."a Under
129. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 678. The Trusteeship Agreement requires the adminis-tering authority to discharge its obligations in accordance with the Charter of theUnited Nations. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands,July 18, 1947, art.4, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 2.
130. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 671.
131. U.N. CHARTER arts. 79, 82, 83.132. U.N. CHARTER art. 79; see H. NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 152 (discussingthe various interpretations of the phrase "directly concerned"). The United States, forinstance, regards itself as the only state directly concerned with the Micronesian Trust.Id. On the other hand, the Soviet interpretation purports that the clause includes all
members of the Security Council. Id. A different viewpoint stresses that this meant
"neighboring power." Id. Although the language of article 72 implies a role for all
states involved, the United States considered itself the only State responsible for theformer Pacific Japanese mandate. Id.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 83, § 1.134. Id. art. 83. Article 82 states that any trusteeship agreement may designate a
strategic area or areas. Id.; see Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 8 (asserting thatthe designation of Micronesia as a strategic trust was an attempt to preserve UnitedStates freedom of action). Article 83 designates that the Security Council must oversee
the alteration, amendment, and termination of a strategic trusteeship. U.N. CHARTER
art. 83, para. 1.
135. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. 667, 677 (1987). The Claims Court felt review of the
changing conditions that apply to the Bikinians and their claims was necessary to putthe issues of Section 177 Agreement effectiveness in perspective. Id.136. Juda I, 13 Cl. Ct. at 669. This case was dismissed, partially due to the at-tempt of the United States to redress the claims of the Bikinians through the Compact
of Free Association. Id. at 683; see Section 177 Agreement, art. X, supra note 113, at12 (asserting that the Agreement constitutes a full settlement of all Marshallese
claims). Article X (Espousal Article) of the Section 177 Agreement states all claims
relating to nuclear testing shall be terminated in the courts of the Marshall Islands. Id.
art. X. Article XII (Termination Article) purports to terminate all such claims in the
United States courts. Id. art. XII, at 13.137. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 451. By its very nature parties do not express the implied-
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the Tucker Act,1 38 the Claims Court has jurisdiction over all claims
against the United States based upon an implied-in-fact contract to
which the government is a party.139 Language in the Trusteeship
Agreement 140 and subsequent agreements between the United States
and the Bikinians, gave rise to conduct sufficient to show that the
parties fulfilled the requirements of an implied-in-fact contract.142
Several other considerations impact on the implied-in-fact jurisdic-
tion of the Claims Court. The Claims Court does not have jurisdiction
over cases sounding primarily in tort.1 43 An implied-in-fact contract
claim, however, may contain elements of tort1 44 without the Tucker Act
being an automatic bar.1 45 Express contracts supersede implied-in-fact
in-fact contract. Id. It is implied from facts and circumstances demonstrating a mutual
intent of parties to contract. Id. A party may not allege an implied contract when an
enforceable contract exists between the parties, resulting in a conflict, relating to the
same subject matter. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 5 (1963).
138. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982).
139. Id. Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States over im-
plied-in-fact contracts. Id.; Juda 1, 6 CI. Ct. at 453.
140. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, art. 6, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302-03, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 3 (stating that the adminis-
tering authority shall promote the economic advancement of the inhabitants and pro-
tect against the loss of land and resources). The Agreement requires the United States
to protect the health of the inhabitants. Id. at 3303, at 3.
141. See Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 448-49 (examining several agreements that arguably
create implied-in-fact fiduciary obligations of the United States for its trusteeship over
the Marshall Islands). On November 22, 1956, the Trust Territory Government
(TTG), established under the Trusteeship Agreement and the Bikini Alabs (family
heads) executed an "Agreement in Principle Regarding Use of Bikini Atoll." Id. at
448. The agreement stated that the Trust Territory Government and/or the United
States government shall have full-use rights to Bikini Atoll as long as necessary. Id.
On June 20, 1957, the TTG and the United States entered into the "Use and Occu-
pancy Agreement for Land in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Under the
Administrative Responsibility of the Department of the Interior." Id. This agreement
grants the United States government the exclusive right to occupy Bikini for an indefi-
nite period. Id. Furthermore, this agreement required the United States to comply with
the Trusteeship Agreement regarding the use of the Bikini Atoll. Id. at 449.
142. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 452. Implied-in-fact contracts and express contracts main-
tain the same offer and acceptance requirements of lack of ambiguity and mutuality of
intent. Id. The contracts differ only on evidentiary grounds. Id.; see also Fincke v.
United States 675 F.2d 289, 295 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (asserting that an implied-in-fact con-
tract requires an inferred meeting of the minds based on the conduct and understand-
ing of the parties). Both an implied-in-fact contract and an express contract require the
representative to possess actual authority to bind the government. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at
452; see Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (stating that
parties entering contracts with the government have the burden of proof regarding the
scope of authority of the government's representatives).
143. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (1982).
144. Id.; see Judo I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 453 (examining the relationship of the implied-in-
fact contract claim to a tort claim).
145. Juda , 6 Cl. Ct. at 453. Actions alleging both a breach of contract and a tort
may not automatically be barred under the Tucker Act. Id.; Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §
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contracts when between the same parties and pertaining to the same
matter.146 Here, no express contract exists between the same parties on
the same matter.4 Although an express bilateral contract was created
when the United States entered into the Trusteeship Agreement with
the United Nations Security Council, that agreement does not preclude
the implied-in-fact contract between the United States and the Bikini-
ans. 48 The United States sought to settle these claims through an ex-
press revocation of its willingness to be sued in the Compact.149 Unlike
the contract claims, the Bikinian takings claims are based on United
States constitutional precepts. 150
2. Takings Claims
Takings clause claims are based on a fundamental principle of
United States constitutional governance.' 5' The takings clause of the
fifth amendment provides that the United States government shall not
take private property without "just compensation."' 2 The Claims
Court is endowed with jurisdiction on all constitutional claims against
the United States. 53
1491(a)(1) (1982).
146. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 454.
147. Id.
148. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 454.
149. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103(g)(1),
99 Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. Id.
152. Id. The takings clause of the fifth amendment provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use, absent just compensation. Id. Just compensation is the
"full and exact equivalent of the property taken." Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). The market value of the property represents
the general standard of compensation. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943); United States ex. rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 285 (1943).
153. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (1982). Article III of the United States
Constitution grants Congress the power to establish courts of inferior jurisdiction. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. In 1933, the Supreme Court concluded that the United States
Court of Claims, predecessor to the Claims Court, was an Article I court. Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553, 581 (1933). Article I courts derive their power from the
Congress, whereas Article III courts derive their power from the judicial article of the
Constitution. Id. Congress, however, statutorily declared the Court of Claims an Arti-
cle III court in 1953. 67 Stat. 226, § I (1953)(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 171
(1982)). In 1962, the Supreme Court agreed to this classification. Glidden Co. v. Zda-
nok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962).
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 replaced the jurisdiction of Court of
Claims with the United States Claims Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982); see Miller, supra
note 90, at 7-13 (discussing the Federal Courts Improvement Act and the jurisdiction
of the Claims Court). The new Claims Court was declared an Article I court in the
1982 Act. 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1982) (original version at 67 Stat. 226, § 1 (1953)).
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The Bikinians brought two alternative takings claims against the
United States, asserting that the United States government took their
property without just compensation. 5 The first claim consisted of two
separate temporary takings, respectively occurring on March 7, 19 4 61a5
and January 24, 1979.116 Alternatively, the Bikinians claimed a single
temporary taking began on March 7, 1946.157
The fifth amendment of the Constitution protects American citizens
from uncompensated takings.15 8 The Claims Court, however, defined
the key question on this issue to be whether the Bikinians were pro-
tected under the United States Bill of Rights.1" The Bikinians resided
in a United Nations trusteeship, neither a territory nor possession of
the United States.160 If the Bill of Rights extends to the Bikinians, they
fall within the jurisdiction of the Claims Court. 61 The government ar-
gued that absent an act of Congress granting constitutional protection
to the Bikinians, the Bill of Rights, of which the just compensation
clause is a part, does not protect them." 2 Absent an act of Congress,
however, the United States Court of Claims, predecessor to the Claims
Court, applied the just compensation clause to government takings
outside United States sovereign territory.6 3 The Claims Court indi-
cated that judicial settlement of these claims was precluded if the
Compact and the Section 177 Agreement were effective.'"
154. Juda I, 6 CI. Ct. at 449.
155. Id. This temporary taking ended January 24, 1979 when the United States
deeded back the Islands. Id.
156. Id. The second temporary taking began just prior to the time that the Depart-
ment of Interior reported that Bikini could not be inhabited for 30 to 60 years. Id. at
448-49.
157. Id. at 449.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 449 (stating that Congress
may apply constitutional provisions to United States territories); see also CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, 1308 (1987) (stating that the Constitu-
tion limits the federal government power of eminent domain).
159. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 456. The Bill of Rights provides fundamental safeguards
for citizens of the United States. Id. The court phrases the issue as whether these rights
protect citizens of the United Nations Trust Territory. Id.
160. Juda I, 6 Cl. Ct. at 456-57.
161. Id.; see Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (1982) (stating that the Claims
Court has jurisdiction over all claims against the United States based upon the
Constitution).
162. Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 456; see id. (examining the United States government's
contention that, absent enabling legislation, the Bill of Rights does not apply to the
Trust Territory inhabitants). But see Fleming v. United States, 352 F.2d 533, 536 (Ct.
Cl. 1965) (accepting the takings argument of the plaintiffs, inhabitants of Saipan, but
rejecting to hold in their favor due to the lack of clear title to the property).
163. Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583, 591 (Ct. Cl. 1974). In Porter, the court
held that the Constitution may extend to Micronesia absent congressional action. Id.
164. Juda 1, 13 Cl. Ct. at 683.
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C. COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION
The Compact of Free Association 65 defines a new relationship be-
tween the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 60
Whereas the Trusteeship sought to promote self-government and inde-
pendence, 167 the Compact sought to transform this relationship into one
of freely associated, but equally sovereign states.168 Nevertheless, the
Claims Court questioned the effectiveness of both the settlement of the
nuclear testing claims and the Compact.169
Several provisions in the Compact help determine its effectiveness.
Section 101(b) of the Compact prescribes the effective dates of the
Compact and the Section 177 Agreement. 170 In addition, section
101(b) requires the consideration of United Nations procedures for ter-
mination of the Trusteeship.'1' Accordingly, the Trusteeship must be
properly terminated prior to implementation of the Compact.
Acknowledging United States responsibility for claims arising from
the American nuclear testing program, Congress included provisions
165. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770
(1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). The preamble of the Com-
pact briefly discusses the evolution of United States relations with Micronesia and the
Marshall Islands. Id. at 1770.
166. Hills, supra note 26, at 584; see id. (asserting that the Micronesian Govern.
ment will conduct their own foreign and internal affairs while the United States retains
control over security and defense matters).
167. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665.
168. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770,
1770 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
169. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 670. The court required the parties to submit additional
briefs to determine if these claims had been settled. Id.
170. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 101(b), 99
Stat. 1770, 1773 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). Section
101(b) of the Compact requires the President to authorize an effective date, in accor-
dance with section 411, for implementation of the Compact. Id. Section 411 requires
the United States to act in fulfillment of its responsibilities as administering authority
under the Trusteeship Agreement to bring the Compact into effect. Id. § 411, at 1827.
One responsibility is to uphold the provisions in the United Nations Charter. Trustee-
ship Agreement for The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947, art. 4, 61
Stat. 3301, 3302, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 2. One provision of the United Nations Charter
directly referred to in the Trusteeship Agreement is article 83. Id. at 3302-03, at 2.
Article 83 provides that the Security Council will carry out all United Nations func-
tions for strategic trusts. U.N. CHARTER art. 83, para. 2. Termination is one such func-
tion, and because the Security Council has not completed it, the Compact is not in
effect under section 411. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
239, § 411, 99 Stat. 1770, 1827 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp.
1986)).
171. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 101(b), 99
Stat. 1770, 1773 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
172. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (describing what the President
mrtmt do to imnlement the Compact).
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for an agreement separate from the Compact. This agreement be-
came known as the Section 177 Agreement; its purpose was to provide
just and adequate settlement of all claims under section 177 of the
Compact.174 The United States government provided $150 million to
fund the provisions of the Section 177 Agreement. 70
The Compact and the Section 177 Agreement, however, are tied
through section 103(g) of the Compact that is the espousal provision of
this international agreement.1 76 Espousal is a widely recognized princi-
ple of international law. It is the ability of a nation to set forth and,
thereby, settle the claims its citizens possess against other nations. 71
Subsection 1 of 103(g) reflects the congressional intent for the agree-
ment to act as the full and final settlement of claims arising under
articles X and XI of the Section 177 Agreement.178 Article X of the
Section 177 Agreement (espousal article) addresses the Republic of the
Marshall Islands espousal of the Bikinian Claims and purports to ter-
minate all claims against the United States in Marshallese courts aris-
ing from the nuclear testing program.179 Article XI of the Agreement
establishes a procedure to indemnify the United States from nuclear
testing claims.180 Article XII of the agreement (termination article)
terminates all the claims in Articles X and XI and removes the juris-
diction of all United States courts on these claims.18' Subsection 2 of
section 103(g) of the Compact ties the jurisdictional limitations of the
termination article of the Section 177 Agreement to the objective of the
espousal article and it may not be implemented separately. 82 When
173. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 177, 99 Stat.
1770, 1812 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). The Compact
requires the United States Government and the Marshallese Government to set forth a
separate agreement for settlement of the Marshallese Nuclear Testing Claims. Id.
174. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103(g), 99
Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (Vest Supp. 1986)); Section
177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. I, § 1, at 2.
175. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. 1, § 1, at 2.
176. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103(g), 99
Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
177. 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1241 (1970).
178. Id. The espousal article addresses the Republic of the Marshall Island es-
pousal of the Bikinian claims. Section 177 Agreement, art. X, supra note 113, at 12.
The termination article provides that all Bikinian claims are terminated in United
States courts. Id. art. XII, at 13. Both provisions addressed the Bikinian claims arising
from American nuclear tests. Id. art. X and XII.
179. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. X, at 12.
180. Id. art. XI, at 12-13.
181. Id. art. XII, at 13.
182. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103(g), 99
Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). Congress
specifically intended the jurisdictional limitations of the termination article of the Sec-
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implementing the Section 177 Agreement, the United States intended
to provide for a full settlement of all claims.18 3 Another interpretation,
however, is possible if the Section 177 Agreement is read in conjunc-
tion with the language of section 103(g) that ties the termination arti-
cle to the espousal article.184 In fact, this agreement and its interpreta-
tion are the focus of Juda II.'s5 Given the various interpretations of the
Compact and the interaction of this agreement with the Bikinian
claims and the Trusteeship Agreement, judicial disposition of this case
proved onerous.
III. THE CLAIMS COURT ANALYSIS IN JUDA
In Juda II, the Claims Court granted the United States motion to
dismiss the Bikinian claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.8' In
reaching this decision, the court found the Compact and the Section
177 Agreement effective; it concluded that Congress had withdrawn
United States consent to be sued. ls7 Whether the Trusteeship Agree-
ment remained in effect played a significant role in the Claims Court
decision on the effectiveness of the Compact and the Section 177
Agreement. 88
A. EFFECT OF TRUSTEESHIP
Prior to discussing the dismissal, the court examined the effectiveness
of the Trusteeship Agreement. 89 The court immediately established
that termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and implementation of
tion 177 Agreement to solely and exclusively accomplish the objective of the espousal
article. Id. Furthermore, the termination article is to act as clarification of the effect of
the espousal article. Id. Finally, the termination article was not intended to be con-
strued or implemented separately from the espousal article. Id.
183. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. X, at 12. Section 1 of the es-
pousal article is titled Full Settlement of All Claims. Id. This provision claims to con-
stitute full settlement of all claims arising from the nuclear testing. Id. After a pur-
ported full settlement of these international claims, the termination article terminates
all claims of this nature and withdraws jurisdiction from the courts. Id. art. XII, at 13.
184. Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at 45-50; see Consolidated Brief, supra
note 15, at 20-32 (asserting that ineffective espousal or other deficiency in the espousal
article would negate the termination article due to the linkage to section 103(g)(2)). In
fact, much of the plaintiffs' argument centers on this contention. Id.
185. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 14; see Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 683-87
(examining the Section 177 Agreement extensively).
186. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 690.
187. Id. at 686.
188. Id. at 677-82. According to the court, the Compact dismisses the plaintiffs'
claims, even though the Trusteeship Agreement remains in force. Id. at 682-90.
189. Id. at 677-82.
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the Compact were separate issues.le° In direct contradiction to section
101(b) of the Compact, the Claims Court decision decoupled the Trus-
teeship Agreement from the Compact.""1 The court determined that
Trusteeship termination was a question of law within the purview of
the court.192
In addition, the Claims Court examined the United Nations Charter
provisions specifically applicable to the trusteeship system and the
Trusteeship Agreement.1 93 The court also examined the stated positions
of the United States government concerning trusteeship termination.,,"
Finally, the court reviewed legislative history to determine whether the
United States intended to comply with its treaty obligations to the
United Nations.1 95
After examining Article 83 of the United Nations Charter, the court
held that the above inquiries required United Nations Security Council
consent to legally terminate the Trusteeship, and that such consent had
not been given.196 According to the court, under both the United Na-
tions Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement, the Trusteeship was still
in de jure (legal) effect.19 7 The court held that effectiveness of the
Compact and the Section 177 Agreement depended on an additional
finding of de facto (actual) termination of the Trusteeship.""' Relying
190. Id. at 678. But see Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at 39-41 (asserting
that Congress intended prior or simultaneous termination of the Trusteeship to effectu-
ate the Compact). Section 101(b) clearly requires effective trusteeship termination
before the Compact may come into effect. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 101(b), 99 Stat. 1770, 1773 (1986) (codified at 48 U..C. §
1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
191. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 101(b), 99
Stat. 1770, 1773 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
192. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 678.
193. Id. at 678, 680-81. The court examined article 83 of the United Nations
Charter which reserves the powers for alteration and amendment of strategic trustee-
ship agreements to the United Nations Security Council. Id.
194. Id. at 679. From 1947 until March 1986, representatives of the United States
consistently acknowledged the necessity of receiving United Nations Security Council
approval for termination of a strategic trusteeship. Id. Writers have also recognized the
role of the Security Council in this arrangement. Hirayasu, supra note 3, at 488;
Bravo's Fallout, supra note 15, at 188.
195. Id. at 681. After examining various congressional action pertaining to the
Compact, the court concluded that the United States intended to abide with the United
Nations Charter provisions governing trusteeship termination. Id.
196. Id. at 678. Although not explicitly stating that termination of strategic trust-
eeships requires Security Council action, the court found that article 83(1) specifically
delegates all functions related to strategic areas to the Security Council. Id. at 678-79;
see supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text (discussing Article 83 and related
passages).
197. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 673.
198. Id. at 682. Although the Trusteeship was in effect de jure, the effectiveness of
the Compact remained unresolved. Id.
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on a decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 99 the court
in Juda II concluded that actual termination of a trusteeship may oc-
cur prior to legal termination.200 The court then proceeded to examine
whether the Compact and the Section 177 Agreement terminated the
Bikinian claims.20 1
B. EFFECT OF THE COMPACT ON BIKINIAN CLAIMS
The Claims Court, after rejecting various assertions of the plaintiffs
regarding Compact effectiveness, found the Compact in force based on
its analysis of the applicable provisions.20 2 The court further concluded
that the Section 177 Agreement203 governed the settlement of all
claims arising from United States nuclear testing in Micronesia. 0 4 Ef-
fectiveness of the Agreement, however, depended on the interaction of
several clauses in the Compact and the Section 177 Agreement.10
As indicated above, two provisions of the Section 177 Agreement
199. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
200. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 682; see Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of
Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 714-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (examining the international status
of Palau, part of the trusteeship). In Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., the court concluded
that ignoring Palau's substantial exercise of sovereignty (de facto termination) while
holding to "formalist indicia of international independence" (de jure termination)
would foreclose the de facto sovereignty concept. Id. at 716. The court, adopting lan-
guage of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Palau was an independent
entity, unless, of course, form was to govern over substance. Id. (citing Murarka v.
Bachrach Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954)). The District Court felt that the dojure approach eclipsed the de facto reality of the new political situation established
through the Compact. Id. at 713.
201. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 682.
202. Id. at 682-83. The Compact and the Section 177 Agreement went into force
on October 21, 1986. Id. From the perspective of the United States government, this
was the most probable date of Compact effectiveness under section 411. Compact of
Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 411, 99 Stat. 1770, 1827 (1986)(codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). After little discussion, the court
held that the Section 177 Agreement was in effect. Juda I1, 13 Cl. Ct. at 683.
203. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, at 1.
204. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 684; see id. at 683 (stating the agreement has the
"force and effect of law"). The Claims Court relied on the language in section 103(g),
asserting that the Section 177 Agreement is intended as a final settlement. Id. In addi-
tion, Congress intended that the full and final settlement of all nuclear-related claims
lie in section 177 and the corresponding agreement. Compact of Free Association Act
of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103 (g)(1), 99 Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48
U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
205. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 683. In the court's view, effectiveness turned on several
Compact provisions, section 103(g)(1) and (2), section 177, and section 471 (c); and the
espousal and termination articles of the Section 177 Agreement). Id. at 683. The
Claims Court proceeded to determine whether the court could continue to hear plain-
tiffs' claims. Id. at 683-86.
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were of particular importance to the Claims Court decision. The es-
pousal article addresses the Republic of the Marshall Island's espousal
of the Bikinian claims.2 06 The termination article provides that all
Bikinian claims are terminated in all United States courts. 07 The court
stated that section 103(g) of the Compact208 clearly linked the espousal
article with the termination article, thereby, terminating the Bikinian
claims.209
Under international law, espousal of the Bikinian claims must be
valid before the Republic of the Marshall Islands can settle them. 10
After a lengthy discussion of the legislative history, the Claims
Court held that section 103(g)(2) did not require an adequate espousal
of the Bikinian claims under the espousal article. 12 This led the Claims
206. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. X, § I, at 12. Section two of the
espousal article purports to terminate all claims against the United States that are
proceeding in Marshallese Courts. Id. art. X, § 2, at 12.
207. Id. art. XII, at 13.
208. Compact Of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103 (g)(1),
99 Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). Section
103(g)(1) states that Section 177 and the Section 177 Agreement are intended as a
"full and final" settlement of all claims listed in articles X and XI of that Agreement.
Id.
209. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 684; see Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art.
X, at 12 (stating that the agreement is a full settlement of all claims against United
States entities arising from the nuclear testing program). Section 2 of the espousal
article, in the Section 177 Agreement terminates all legal proceedings in Marshallese
courts based on these claims. Id. The termination article states that all claims articu-
lated in the espousal article are terminated and that no United States court shall have
jurisdiction to entertain such claims. Id. art. XII, at 13. This language, if effective,
completely dismisses all plaintiffs' claims and actions, thereby removing any judicial
remedy. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 686-87.
210. 6 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 802 (1943); see M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 177, at 1233 (examining the position of the United States on
espousal). According to Assistant Secretary of State Dutton, the internationally ac-
cepted view is that a state cannot seek compensation for individuals who were not its
nationals at the time of their loss. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 177, at 1233 (quoting a
letter of Secretary Dutton).
211. Juda 11, 13 Cl. Ct. at 684-85; see id. (examining the legislative history to
determine the impact of section 103(g)(2)). The original House of Representatives ver-
sion of section 103(g)(2), expressly provided that the termination article would not
divest the claims if the courts determine the invalidity of the espousal article or es-
pousal generally. Id. at 685. This version, however, was not utilized. Id. In the opinion
of the Claims Court, the final version of section 103 (g)(2) expressly eliminated all
judicial consideration of the espousal article. Id. at 685. The Claims Court held that
section 103(g)(2) merely clarifies section 103(g)(l) and is subject to Congress' intent
that espousal is valid and effective. Id.
212. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 684-86. In effect, this adopted the government position
that section 103(g)(2) clarifies section 103(g)(1) and does not require judicial inquiry
into the validity of the espousal article. Id. at 684; see id. at 684 (expressing the gov-
ernment assertion that the first sentence in section 103 (g)(2) explicitly states that
section 177 is ratified and approved in furtherance of congressional intent, as enunci-
ated in section 103(g)(1)). The Claims Courts expressly held that the termination arti-
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Court to conclude that the jurisdictional divesting language of the ter-
mination article was effective.2 13 Having reached this conclusion, the
court avoided lengthy discussion regarding the ability of the Marshall
Islands to validly espouse the Bikinian claims214 because it found that
jurisdiction divestment under the termination article did not depend
upon valid espousal.2 5 Instead, the court addressed other challenges to
the termination article divestment.218
The Claims Court examined the constitutionality of the procedures
established to resolve the claims.217 The court rejected the argument
that a blank withdrawal of access to any judicial forum for Bikinian
claims was an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. 218 Further-
more, the court rejected plaintiffs' case law on this proposition 219 as
cle was not dependant upon a judicial determination of espousal validity under the
espousal article. Id. at 686.
213. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 686.
214. Id. at 684-86.
215. Id. at 686. But see id. at 685-86 (acknowledging that valid claim espousal is
derived from recognized international law concepts involving the continuity of national-
ity). The court asserted that, although the United States accepts the espousal doctrine
it was inapplicable to the facts of the case. Id.
216. Id. at 687-89. This followed the courts examination of the Tucker Act. Id. at
686-87. The court stated that the Tucker Act's dual nature encompassed both a grant
of jurisdiction and a waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 686; United States v. Mitch-
ell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (examining this dual nature); see Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at
686-89 (examining the nature of the Tucker Act and holding that the Act creates a
waiver of sovereign immunity for those claims in which it grants Claims Court jurisdic-
tion). The Claims Court asserted that both of plaintiffs' claims involve public rights
and are subject to the public rights doctrine. Id. at 686-87. The public rights doctrine
recognizes that as part of its sovereign immunity, the United States government can
put conditions on its consent to be sued. Id. at 687; see also Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-76. (1982) (examining the
development of the public rights doctrine out of sovereign immunity and separation of
powers).
217. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 687-89; see id. (examining the two major constitutional
challenges to the claims settlement). The plaintiffs first argued that this settlement was
an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and in fact a taking itself. Id. at 687.
The plaintiffs next argued that an alternative settlement, while acceptable, only re-
mains so if it provides a reasonable, certain, and adequate means for compensation at
the time of taking. Id. at 689; see The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. 102, 125 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S.
641, 658 (1890)) (citing the same prerequisites for acceptable alternative settlement).
218. Juda 11 13 Cl. Ct. at 688-89. The court held that when the United States
creates a right against itself it is under no obligation to provide a judicial remedy as
long as an obligation is recognized and alternative fulfillment is provided. Id. The court
relies on two cases for this proposition. Id. In United States v. Babcock, the Supreme
Court held that the United States is under no obligation to provide a judicial remedy
when it creates rights against itself. United States v. Babcock 250 U.S. 328, 331
(1919) (citing numerous authority). In Lynch v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that as long as Congress recognizes its contractual responsibility, it may indicate
alternative fulfillment. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934).
219. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 687-88; see Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at 51-55
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inapposite and contradictory to the claims presented in the case.220
Consequently, the court restricted plaintiffs' case law to their factual
circumstances.22'
The plaintiffs argued that alternative compensation2 22 must be ad-
dressed at the time of the taking.223 In addition, the plaintiffs asserted
that compensation must be reasonable, certain, and adequate at the
time of the taking to be constitutional. 2 The Claims Court responded
that the settlement procedure provides for reasonable and certain com-
pensation 25 The court stated that the third constitutional requirement,
adequate compensation, could not be determined presently.22 The
court considered these arguments premature because the settlement
procedure was incomplete.227
According to the court, section 103(g)(2) allows the Bikinian claims
(asserting that the rule of United States v. Klein and Battaglia v. General Motors
Corp. is that jurisdictional statutes are constitutionally limited and Congress may not
create obstacles to constitutional rights and obligations); Plaintiffs' Memorandum In
Opposition To Defendant's Amended Motion To Dismiss at 20-25, Juda v. United
States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667 (1987) (No. 172-81L) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Opposition] (list-
ing cases in support of this claim).
220. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 687. The court rejected the rule of United States v.
Klein, restricting it to its facts. Id. The court also rejected plaintiffs' proposition that
Congress can not enact jurisdictional standards that prevent constitutional rights vindi-
cations. Id. at 688. In Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that although Congress has the power to restrict inferior court jurisdic-
tion, it must not do so to exact an uncompensated taking of private property. 169 F.2d
at 257; see Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 431 (1931) (asserting that
Congress, even if it had authority to dispense with a substantive right, could not ac-
complish that result through a blanket denial of remedy against the United States).
The Claims Court, however, distinguished Battaglia, rejecting its application to these
facts. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 688.
221. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 687-88.
222. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. 1, § 1, at I. The S150 million
claims settlement fund is for all Marshallese claims arising from the United States
Testing Program. Id; see id. art. II, at 3-7 (listing disbursement amounts). The Bikini-
ans are not the only Marshallese with nuclear testing claims against the United States.
Juda 1, 6 Cl. Ct. at 443. As many as 5,000 claims have been filed by the Marshallese,
all of which would be compensated from this fund. Id.
223. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 45.
224. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 689; see The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974) (requiring that alternative compensation be reasonable,
certain, and adequate at the time of taking). The plaintiffs assert that Congress cannot
extinguish their claims unless it meets these just compensation requirements. Juda II,
13 Cl. Ct. at 689. The plaintiffs further contend that before they are subjected to the
claims settlement provision, they must have the opportunity to prove it unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 689.
225. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 689.
226. Id.
227. Id. But see Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659
(1890) (stating that property owners are entitled to reasonable, certain, and adequate
compensation prior to obstruction of their interest).
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to be dismissed absent valid espousal of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands.22 8 The court found precedent supporting the proposition that
Congress may withdraw government consent for suit,221 9 and that the
termination article of the Section 177 Agreement is an effective form
of withdrawal. 230 Additionally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' con-
stitutional challenge to the Section 177 settlement procedures. 231 The
court rejected the unconstitutional legislative exercise argument2 32 and
the just alternative compensation argument. 3 Finally, the court held
that the Section 177 Agreement settled the Bikinian claims, warranting
dismissal of this case.23 4 The question now turns to whether an alterna-
tive approach was possible.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS COURT DECISION
In Juda II, the Claims Court holding that the effectiveness of the
Section 177 Agreement necessitated the dismissal of the Bikinian
claims 23 5 is erroneous for two reasons. First, the Compact and the Sec-
tion 177 Agreement are not currently in effect.236 Second, even if these
agreements were in effect, they would not dismiss the plaintiffs claims
due to the unconstitutionality of such an action. 37 The questionable
nature of these issues made dismissal of this case an inadequate
resolution.
228. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 685-86.
229. Id. at 689-90.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 687-89.
232. Id. at 687-88.
233. Id. at 688-89.
234. Id. at 690. The court held that the termination article of the Section 177
Agreement implicitly amended the Tucker Act jurisdiction of the Claims Court,
thereby, withdrawing consent of the United States to be sued. Id.
235. Id.
236. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 20. The Claims Court refused to effectu-
ate the language of the Compact relating to espousal under the espousal article. See
Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at I (stating that the Trusteeship Agreement has
not ended and that Congress did not intend the Compact to take effect until the Trus-
teeship Agreement had terminated).
237. See Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 32 (asserting that dismissal would
be an unconstitutional foreclosure on plaintiffs' taking claims without adequate provi-
sions for alternative remedies).
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A. THE COMPACT AND THE SECTION 177 AGREEMENT ARE NOT IN
EFFECT
1. The Compact Can Not Be Effective Absent Application of the
Trusteeship Agreement
After an extensive discussion of the relevant United Nations Charter
provisions and the Trusteeship Agreement, 2 8 the Claims Court held
the Agreement between the United Nations Security Council and the
United States in de jure effect under international law.2'3 The dichoto-
mous result of the court's opinion, creating both a de jure and a de
facto effect,240 allowed the Trusteeship Agreement to terminate absent
the required Security Council action. 24 1 This conclusion erroneously as-
sumed that the Trusteeship Agreement was not relevant to the effec-
tiveness of the Compact.242
This result contradicts the express language of the United Nations
Charter and the Compact. 243 The United Nations Charter, made appli-
238. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 678-82.
239. Id. at 682.
240. Id. at 672.
241. Id. Both the Trusteeship Agreement and the Compact gave the United Na-
tions Security Council governing authority over the strategic trust. Trusteeship Agree-
ment For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947, art. 4, 61 Stat. 3301,
3302, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 2; Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-239, § 411, 99 Stat. 1770, 1827 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (Vest Supp.
1986)); see Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 411, 99
Stat. 1770, 1827 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)) (stating
that the Compact will come into effect upon mutual agreement with the United States
acting in fulfillment of the administering authority's responsibility). Section 101(b) of
the Compact requires that the United Nations procedures for trusteeship termination
be "taken into account." Id. at 1773. One responsibility of the United States was to
follow the precepts of the United Nations Charter which requires Security Council
action to terminate the trust. U.N. CHARTER art. 83, para. 1. But see Juda II, 13 Cl.
Ct. at 682 (stating that whether the Trusteeship Agreement is formally terminated
under United Nations procedures is an issue for the International Court of Justice
[ICJ] to decide). The ICJ may give an advisory opinion on any legal matter to any
entity authorized to make a request under the United Nations Charter. Statute of The
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 65, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993.
242. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 682; see id. (finding the issue of Compact effectiveness
unresolved despite the Claims Court holding that the Trusteeship Agreement was not
terminated de jure).
243. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing the language in the
Compact and the Charter). According to the Claims Court, all approvals for Compact
termination had been given and all the steps necessary for Compact effectiveness had
been completed. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 682. The Claims Court overlooked the necessary
agreement of the Security Council to terminate the Trusteeship, pursuant to both the
United Nations Charter, and the Trusteeship Agreement. U.N. CHARTER art. 83. Only
the Security Council has the power to alter, amend, or approve strategic trusteeship
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cable in the Trusteeship Agreement,244 reserves all strategic trust func-
tions of the United Nations to the Security Council.2 " Moreover, sec-
tion 101(b) of the Compact requires the United States to consider
United Nations trusteeship procedures.246 Section 411 of the Compact
requires the United States to act in fulfillment of its trusteeship
responsibilities.247
The Claims Court recognized that trusteeship and free association
are incompatible. 248 Any attempt to make the Compact effective with-
agreements. Id. The United States claimed that it could not obtain the requisite Secur-
ity Council action due to the recalcitrance of the Soviet Union. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at
682.
244. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, art. 4, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 2.
245. U.N. CHARTER art. 83, para. 1. This article gives the Security Council author-
ity over all functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas. Id. This power
includes the approval, alteration, or amendment of trusteeship agreement terms. Id.
The plaintiffs contended that these powers included approval of termination. Plaintiffs'
Response, supra note 45, at 11. Although termination is not included, the case law
indicates that the Security Council's powers are vast and that the "including" language
of article 83(1) is not limited to the powers enumerated. Federal Land Bank v. Bis-
marck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99-100 (1941) (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 189 (1941)); Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Interstate Com-
merce Comm'n, 645 F.2d 1102, 1112 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Certified Color Mfg.
Ass'n v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The Claims Court recognized
the necessity of United Nations Security Council action for termination. Juda II, 13
Cl. Ct. at 678 (citing Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180
(1982)). The court relied on Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano for the pro-
position that the phrase "including any alteration or amendment", if given its obvious
meaning, includes termination of the agreement. Id.
246. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 101(b), 99
Stat. 1770, 1773 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). The Trus-
teeship Agreement requires the United States to act in accordance with the United
Nations Charter in fulfilling its obligations. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former
Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947, art. 4, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302, T.I.A.S. No.
1665, at 2. Trusteeship termination requires Security Council action under article
83(1). U.N. CHARTER art. 83, para. 1. Absent Security Council action to terminate the
trusteeship, sections 101(b) and 411 of the Compact bar compact effectiveness because
United States administering responsibilities require action in accordance with article
83(1) of the United Nations Charter. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-239, § 101(b), 99 Stat. 1770i 1773, (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681(West Supp. 1986)); see id. (authorizing presidential action subject to United Nations
procedures) and id. § 411 at 1827 (requiring that the United States act according to its
responsibilities as trust administrator).
247. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 411, 99 Stat.
1770, 1827 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). After taking
into account any procedures of the United Nations for trusteeship agreements, the
President may reach an effective date for the Compact and implement it at such time.
Id. Section 411 states that the Compact will enter into effect upon mutual agreement
of the countries, with the United States acting in fulfillment of its administering au-
thority. Id. § 411, at 1827; see supra note 241 (discussing the requirements of section
411).
248. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 677-78.
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out Security Council approval of Trusteeship termination would fail ac-
cording to the effective date language of the Compact provisions. 24 1 On
November 3, 1986, President Reagan, absent Security Council termi-
nation of the Trusteeship, proclaimed the Trusteeship no longer in ef-
fect.2 50 According to the President termination became effective on Oc-
tober 21, 1986.251 Without Security Council approval of termination,
these provisions preclude the effectiveness of the Compact, and, hence,
preclude the dismissal provisions of the Section 177 Agreement. 5 2
For the court to hold otherwise leads to the conclusion that Congress
passed a statute that is inconsistent with a treaty.2 3 Applicable case
law requires reconciliation of inconsistencies between a statute and
treaty to the greatest extent possible. 25' A statute may alter an existing
treaty if the courts find clear intent on the part of Congress. 55 In this
case, the Compact, a product of legislative compromise, can be inter-
preted in various ways. 258 Furthermore, the inconsistency of key
passages and the legislative history of the statute leave the Compact
ambiguous. Thus, the clear intent requirement is not met, and the
Compact is ineffective without trusteeship termination.257
249. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 101(b), 99
Stat. 1770, 1773 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). The plain-
tiffs asserted that congressional intent was for the Compact to take effect only after
trusteeship termination. Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at 38-43. Apparently, the
executive branch represented to Congress that trusteeship termination and free associa-
tion would occur simultaneously. Id. at 39. Defendant's linkage of these agreements
indicates that the Compact is not in effect because effective termination has not taken
place. Id. at 41.
250. Proclamation No. 5564, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1986).
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text (examining various Compact,
Trusteeship Agreement, and United Nations Charter provisions).
253. Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at 41.
254. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1098 (1981); see United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 222 (1902) (apply-
ing the principle of statutory construction that requires reconciliation of statutes to the
greatest extent possible to a treaty between China and the United States).
255. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (asserting that a later stat-
ute will not be considered to have abrogated or modified a treaty unless Congress
makes this result expressly clear). A statutes purpose to override a treaty, or a part
thereof, must appear "clearly and distinctly" in its wording. United States v. Payne,
264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902).
256. Compare Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 20-29 (arguing that section
103(g)(2) of the Compact links the espousal article and the termination article of the
Section 177 Agreement) with Appellees Brief, supra note 86, at 26-32 (asserting that
section 103(g)(2) of Compact does not require the espousal article and the termination
article of the Section 177 Agreement to be linked).
257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
115(1)(a) (1986); see id. (examining the relationship between an act of Congress and
an international agreement, and noting the clear intent standard). Acts of Congress
supersede early international agreements as United States law if that purpose is clear
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2. Section 103(g) Linkage of Espousal and Termination Articles of
the Section 177 Agreement
Espousal is the ability of a nation to set forth and, thereby, settle the
claims its citizens possess against other nations.258 If the espousal of
these claims did not comply with international law, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands could not settle these claims with the United
States.2 59 Thus, dismissal pursuant to claims settlement would be
ineffective.
As the plaintiffs argued, section 103(g)(2) links the espousal and ter-
mination articles of the Section 177 Agreement, thereby, requiring es-
pousal validity for dismissal of the claims.260 In fact, the linkage of
these provisions is a direct result of Claims Court questioning on the
propriety of dismissal absent proper espousal."' Furthermore, these ar-
ticles require a court determination on the validity of the Republic of
the Marshall Islands espousal of these claims.262 The language of sec-
tion 103(g)(2) and the applicable legislative history make it clear that
espousal validity is necessary to effectuate dismissal under the termina-
tion Article.26
The clear meaning of section 103(g) of the Compact shows the
linkage of the espousal and termination articles of the Section 177
Agreement. 264 The extent of this linkage, however, is ambiguous. 05 It
or if the act or provision cannot be fairly reconciled. Id.
258. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 177, at 1241; G. HACKWORTH, supra note 210, at
802.
259. G. HACKWORTH, supra note 210, at 802.
260. Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at 45-50; Consolidated Brief, supra note
15, at 21-22.
261. Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 219, at 7. The Claims Court pointed out
that the termination article alone would apparently strip Claims Court jurisdiction,
despite espousal validity under the espousal article. Id. Congress recognized serious
constitutional questions on the validity of the Section 177 Agreement. 131 CONG. REc.
S15607-8 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1985) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); 131 CONG. REc.
H6345 (daily ed. July 25, 1985) (statement of Rep. Bryant). The plaintiffs successfully
lobbied Congress to link the espousal and termination articles of the Section 177
Agreement, through section 103(g). Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at 45; Plain-
tiffs' Opposition, supra note 219, at 7. If Marshall Islands espousal was invalid under
international law, then a flat withdrawal of jurisdiction might be unconstitutional. 131
CONG. REc. S15607-8 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1985) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum);
H.R. REP. No. 188, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 34 (1985).
262. Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 45, at 44-47; Consolidated Brief, supra note
15, at 16-22.
263. 131 CONG. REC. H 11829 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985) (statement of Rep. Seiber-
ling); H.R. REP. No. 188, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 34 (1985).
264. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103(g)(1),
(2), 99 Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)).
Section 103(g)(2) indicates that the explicit understanding and intent of Congress was
for the jurisdictional limitations of the termination article to be enacted "solely and
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is clear that this agreement intended to constitute the full and final
settlement of all nuclear testing claims.2 6 6 The existence of precondi-
tions for a full and final settlement was a central legal issue of this
case. 267 Except for the linkage language of section 103(g)(2), no other
provisions in the Compact or in the Section 177 Agreement exist to
prevent termination of the claims once the Trusteeship is terminated. 0 8
The parties in Juda II agreed that Congressional intent indicated
that the Section 177 Agreement was to provide a full settlement. 69
The parties, however, disagreed on whether Congress required the
courts to determine the validity of espousal before implementing the
termination article.27 0 Determining the actual meaning of section
103(g)(2) is necessary to resolve this issue.7
The language of section 103(g)(2) is clear. The second sentence of
Section 103(g)(2) indicates qualification on approval of the Compact
settlement. 2  Congress intended the jurisdictional and claim divest-
ment of the termination article to achieve the objective of the espousal
article and to serve as a clarification of the effect of the espousal arti-
cle. Congress stated that the termination article could not be construed
or implemented separately from the espousal article. 73 The objectives
of the espousal article include Republic of Marshall Islands espousal
exclusively" to achieve the objective of the espousal article. Id. In addition, the termi-
nation article was enacted as a clarification of espousal article effect and was not to be
construed or implemented independently from the espousal article. Id.
265. Id.; see supra note 264 and accompanying text (citing the relevant language);
Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 219, at 7 (examining the differing opinions of the
Bikinians and the United States government over the impact of section 103(g)(2) of
the Compact).
266. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103(g)(1),
99 Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (West Supp. 1986)). Other
provisions also intend this to constitute a full and final settlement of these claims. Sec-
tion 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. X, § 1, at 12.
267. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 684; Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. X, §
1, at 12; Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103 (g)(2),
99 Stat. 1770, 1773 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (Vest Supp. 1986)).
268. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, at 1; Compact of Free Association
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681
(West Supp. 1986)).
269. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 684.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 21. The plain language of section
103(g)(2) of the Compact indicates that the settlement approval of Congress is quali-
fied. Id.
273. Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 103 (g)(2),
99 Stat. 1770, 1782 (1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (Vest Supp. 1986)); see
Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 20 (reiterating the qualifications on the Section
177 Agreement).
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and termination of Bikinian claims against the United States. 74 With-
out adequate espousal under international law, an effect to these objec-
tives may not be given, and dismissal of the Bikinian claims cannot
occur.27 5 Therefore, the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the
termination article, does not clarify the espousal article absent ade-
quate espousal of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and cannot be
effected separately from the espousal article.78
The legislative history of the Compact and the Section 177 Agree-
ment further support the conclusion that dismissal of the Bikinian
claims would not occur absent the validity of the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands' espousal of these claims. 277 Congress had serious ques-
tions regarding the constitutionality of the Section 177 Agreement be-
cause it denied people under a United States Trusteeship access to
United States courts.278 In response, the House of Representatives
added its version of Section 103(g)(2) to the Compact.27 9 This provi-
sion explicitly provided that the termination article would not divest
jurisdiction if a United States court of competent jurisdiction held the
espousal article invalid as a matter of international law or for any other
reason. 280 The Senate version of the Compact did not have a similar
281provision.
In lieu of a House-Senate conference, members of both the House
and the Senate compromised over the course of several meetings in De-
cember 1985.282 The House rejected the Senate decision to adopt the
espousal and termination articles from the Senate version of the Sec-
tion 177 Agreement without change.28 3 The Senate agreed to modify
274. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. X, at 342.
275. G. HACKWORTH, supra note 210, at 802.
276. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 22. The second sentence of section
103(g)(2) of the Compact provides continuing jurisdiction if the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands espousal was not valid and effective. Id. This is supported by the fact that,
section 103(g)(2) and articles X, XI, and XII of the Section 177 Agreement form a
coherent design for jurisdiction in the event espousal is invalid. Id. at 21.
277. 131 CONG. REC. S15607 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1985) (statement of Sen. Met-
zenbaum); H.R. Rep. No. 188, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 34 (1985).
278. 131 CONG. REC. S15606-8 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1985) (statements of Senators
Simon, Metzenbaum, Matsunaga, Kerry, and Kennedy); 131 CONG. REc. H6345
(daily ed. July 25, 1985) (statement of Rep. Bryant).
279. 131 CONG. REc. H6369 (daily ed. July 25, 1985); see H.R. REP. No. 188,
99th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 1, at 34 (1985) (explaining that section 2 of 103(g) of the
Compact provides that if a United States court determines espousal invalid, the termi-
nation article will not bar judicial consideration).
280. 131 CONG. REC. H6369 (daily ed. July 25, 1985); Consolidated Brief, supra
note 15, at 25-27.
281. 131 CONG. REC. S15610 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1985).
282. Id.; Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 685.
283. 131 CONG. REc. H11789-828 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985). The Senate version
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these articles through section 103(g) of the Compact;28' however, they
deleted all language referring to judicial consideration of the espousal
article.285
The statements of the sponsoring members of Congress on the pas-
sage of legislation are significant sources for determining Congressional
intent.288 The court, tacitly adopting the arguments of the government,
found that Congress intended effective Republic of the Marshall Is-
lands espousal, eliminating judicial consideration of the espousal arti-
cle.2 7 The court based its decision on contradictory statements of vari-
ous Senators and Representatives and the lack of explicit language in
the compromise bill on judicial consideration of the espousal article. 88
The interpretations of legislative co-sponsors, however, carry more
weight.289
Case law indicates that considerable weight is given to the views of
Representative Seiberling, House floor manager of the bill and Com-
pact co-sponsor.20 Following the House Interior Committee interpreta-
did not address the Section 177 Agreement at all. Id. at 11789. The House version
added the language that became law. Id. at 11810-11.
284. 131 CONG. REc. S17653 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1985) (statements of Sen. Dole
and Sen. Byrd).
285. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 685.
286. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
287. Juda II, 13 CI. Ct. at 685.
288. Id.
289. See infra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing the weight given to
legislative pronouncements).
290. See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978) (stating that the remarks
of a legislative sponsor are crucial when other history is lacking); Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1980) (explaining that the statements of sponsors and floor
managers of a bill are entitled to weight); see also Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S.
253, 263 (1986) (asserting that statements of individual legislators are evidence of
Congressional intent when consistent with statutory language and legislative history).
In the instant situation the statutory language is ambiguous and the legislative history
is limited, therefore, the statements of Representative Seiberling are entitled to consid-
eration. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978). As chairman of the House
Interior Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks, the principal subcommit-
tee involved with the Compact, Representative Seiberling chaired 13 of 26 House hear-
ings on the Compact, one exclusively devoted to the Section 177 Agreement. Consoli-
dated Reply Brief of Appellants at 4, People of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utrik, and
Other Marshall Islands Atolls v. The United States, Nos. 88-1206 to -1208 (Fed. Cir.
7/29/88) [hereinafter Consolidated Reply]. Representative Seiberling was also leader
of the House negotiating team for the Compact compromise. Id.
Therefore, Representative Seiberling's interpretations are considered authoritative.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). The judi-
ciary must look to the sponsors of legislation when questioning its meaning. See In re
Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 34 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983) (reiterating that a floor manager's statutory interpreta-
tions are authoritative). Debate from the House in which the section of the bill
originated is more persuasive. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254 (1956). But see
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tion,2191 Representative Seiberling presented the compromise bill to the
House, explaining that if the espousal article was valid, espousal would
be successful and all claims would therefore be non-justiciable.92 Ac-
cording to Representative Seiberling, if the espousal article was invalid
on international legal or other grounds the Bikinian claims would re-
main justiciable regardless of the termination article.293 Recognizing
that the House-Senate compromise changed the language to some ex-
tent, Representative Seiberling reassured Congress that the new version
was effectively the same.294 The clear intention of the House, 215 the
Interior Committee, and Representative Seiberling was for the termi-
nation article to turn on valid espousal.2 " 6
In view of the language of section 103(g)(2) and Congressional in-
Appellee's Brief, supra note 86, at 31 (asserting that plaintiffs' reliance on a single
floor statement cannot prevail over the plain language in section 103(g)).
The defendant, as appellee, relied on United States v. James to show that fragments
of legislative history do not expressly constitute clear Congressional intent. United
States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986); see Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260(1945) (holding that ambiguous legislative history cannot override the facially express
meaning of a statute). Id. The government asserted that the views of individual mem-
bers cannot overcome statutory language which is facially clear. Appellee's Brief, supra
note 86, at 31 n.29. This statutory language, however, is not as clear as the defendant/
appellee contended. See Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 219, at 7 (examining the
ambiguity of the statutory language). In fact, the cornerstone of this litigation, whether
the Section 177 Agreement terminates the Bikinian cases is built upon competing inter-
pretations of the statutory language. Id. at 6-7.
291. H.R. REP. No. 188, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 34 (1985). The House
Interior Committee explained that its version of section 103(g)(2) was to ensure that
the termination article would not act as a bar to Bikinian claims if the courts deter-
mined that the espousal article was invalid. Id.
292. 131 CONG. REc. H 11829 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985) (statement of Rep. Seiber-
ling) (asserting that if a court finds the espousal article invalid, for any reason, the
compromise language is the same as the House language). Under these circumstances,
the termination article would be ineffective. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id; Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 685.
295. 131 CONG. REc. H11828-38 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985). No house member
challenged Representative Seiberling's contention that if the espousal article was defec-
tive, the termination article would be inoperative. Id. Representative Solarz, however,
stated that the Compact settled the Marshallese claims for $150 million. Id. at 1186(statement of Representative Solarz). Both sides of this litigation made forceful argu-
ments on what Congress "clearly intended." Compare Consolidated Brief, supra note
15, at 29 (stating that Congress approved the Compact without hearing a single chal-
lenge to Chairman Seiberling's explanation) with Appellee's Brief, supra note 86, at 32(stating that Congressman Lagomarsino, a Compact sponsor, in retrospect, confirmed
that Congressional intent for section 103(g)(2) was a rejection of earlier versions). It is
important to note that this contradiction to Chairman Seiberling was in the following
Congress and should be viewed as a retrospective comment. Consolidated Reply, supra
note 290, at 5. Furthermore, Representative Lagomarsino, in the midst debate over the
Compact, remained silent when the opportunity to challenge Chairman Seiberling's as-
sertion was present. 131 CONG. REC. H11828-38 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985).
296. Id. at 11829.
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tent, the Claims Court erred in dismissing the claims without determin-
ing whether espousal of the Republic of the Marshall Islands was
valid.297 The procedure for divestment of plaintiffs' claims turns on
principles of international law, particularly espousal.0 8 Valid espousal
requires continuity of nationality. 9 9 Continuity of nationality mandates
that individuals with espousal claims must hold the claims continuously
and be nationals of the asserting state from the date the claims arose to
the date they were discovered.300 When the claims in this case arose,
the plaintiffs were not citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
or any state because no state existed.30 1 There was, therefore, no con-
tinuity of nationality. In fact, however, the plaintiffs recognized the
United States as their governing authority pursuant to the Trusteeship
Agreement. 0 2 The rules of international law are directly applicable for
determining the status of international entities. The continuity of na-
tionality requirement for espousal is recognized specifically for situa-
tions where state creation or succession could change domestic claims
into international ones. 303 Section 103(g) of the Compact requires judi-
297. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 685-86.
298. 131 CONG. REC. H11829 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985); see The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that international law is part of United States law
and that courts of appropriate jurisdiction must determine and interpret international
law); see also Dayton v. Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 834 F.2d 203, 206-07 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (citing a letter of an assistant Secretary of State, reiterating that espousal is
an established principle of international law). The executive and legislative branches
realized that the issue of espousal could turn on judicial determination. Section 177
Agreement, supra note 113, art. XI, at 12-3. The indemnity provision of the Section
177 Agreement, Article XI is indicative of this recognition. Id. The article requires the
Republic of the Marshall Islands to indemnify the United States from the S150 million
Marshallese claims fund if a successful suit is brought against the United States. Id.
299.' M. WHITEMAN, supra note 177, at 1241.
300. Id.; G. HACKWORTH, supra note 210, at 815.
301. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 672. After a referendum on March 1, 1979, the Repub-
lic of the Marshall Islands inaugurated a parliamentary constitutional government on
May 1, 1979. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, PO-
LITICAL CHRONOLOGY 18-9 (1986); see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EVOLUTION OF THE
FORMER TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 2 (Feb. 1989) (indicating that
constitutional governments came into power in both the Republic of Marshall Islands
and the Federated States for Micronesia in 1979). The Claims Court found that the
Bikinians could not have been citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands for
purposes of continuity of nationality. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 686. The court recognized
that since the 1960s, the Republic of the Marshall Islands was a staltu nascendi, or
government evolving into a state, and that the plaintiffs are only now its citizens. Id. at
677. The Republic of the Marshall Islands was not in existence and the Bikinians were
not its citizens when these claims arose and ripened. Id. at 686.
302. Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, art. 3, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, at 2. The Trusteeship Agreement
provided that the United States would have full powers of administration, legislation,
and jurisdiction. Id.
303. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 57; Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note
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cial determination on the validity of espousal in the Section 177 Agree-
ment.30 Because espousal is invalid, the court should not have dis-
missed these claims.30 5 Furthermore, there are constitutional problems
that preclude the effectiveness of the termination article of the Section
177 Agreement.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS PREVENT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
TERMINATION ARTICLE
Although the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the termi-
nation article did not bar Marshallese claims, the plaintiffs further ar-
gued that this article was ineffective on constitutional grounds.306 First,
a blanket denial of jurisdiction on takings and breach of contract
claims is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power that consti-
tutes an uncompensated taking.30 7 Second, the alternative forum that
the Section 177 Agreement provides is insufficient according to consti-
tutional standards.308 These alternate constitutional challenges prohib-
ited a dismissal of the complaint.
1. Unconstitutional Exercise of Legislative Authority
The termination article of the Section 177 Agreement is a categori-
cal withdrawal of jurisdiction from all courts of the United States on
all claims that arise from the United States nuclear testing program in
the Marshall Islands.30 9 The government can not disavow United States
obligations originating under the Constitution.3 10 The parties, however,
agreed that Congress can control lower federal court jurisdiction under
219, at 9. A letter to former Representative Udall expresses the diplomatic necessity
for continuity of nationality succinctly, "[A] state does not have the right to ask an-
other state to pay compensation to it for losses or damages sustained by persons who
were not its citizens at the time of loss or damage." Letter From Assistant Secretary of
State Dentin to Representative Udall (Dec. 15, 1961), quoted in M. WHITEMAN, supra
note 177, at 1233; see also I D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 538 (1967) (explaining that a domestic injury to a national
of a foreign state is not transformed into an international wrong through a nationality
change resulting from state succession).
304. 131 CONG. REC. H11829 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985).
305. See supra notes 297-304 and accompanying text (discussing espousal
validity).
306. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 687-89.
307. Id. at 687.
308. Id. at 689.
309. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. XII, at 13.
310. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934). Contract claims against
the United States are protected under the fifth amendment. Id. at 579; see Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330, 352 (1935) (asserting that as the United States enters
contracts it acquires rights and responsibilities similar to private individuals).
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article III of the Constitution."" The question is whether congressional
regulation of inferior court jurisdiction can divest constitutionally pro-
tected claims.312
Even advocates of broad congressional power over jurisdiction con-
cede that Congress cannot use a jurisdictional pretext to prevent the
vindication of a constitutional rights claims,313 such as the takings
claims in this case. Clear precedent mandates that Congress not act in
opposition to the Constitution. Thus, under the guise of jurisdictional
restraint, Congress cannot achieve unconstitutional results.315 There-
fore, the termination article of the Section 177 Agreement must be
held constitutionally violative.
Congress can not constitutionally deprive jurisdiction without validly
extinguishing the claims that gave rise to jurisdiction.310 Two cases are
dispositive of this proposition with regard to the plaintiffs' constitu-
tional claims: Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.3"" and United States
311. Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 219, at 18; see U.S. CONsT. art. III, cl. I(stating that United States judicial power is held in one "Supreme Court" and in the
inferior courts that Congress will establish). The dimensions of congressional power to
regulate "inferior courts," is a constant source of debate in the legal community. Com-
pare Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Forward: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 17, 26 (1981) (asserting that although the lower federal courts are not protected
with a constitutional grant of jurisdiction, they are also not without defense from con-
gressional attack) and Id. at 70 (insisting that congressional authority over inferior
federal jurisdiction does not extend to restricting access for "disfavored constitutional
claims") with Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1031 (1982) (arguing that the ability of Congress to create
lower federal courts with restricted jurisdiction is based on a compromise of the consti-
tutional framers). According to Bator, that compromise was based on the agreement
that Congress was the branch "best suited" for an institutional decision based on
changing circumstances. Id.
312. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 33 (questioning whether Congress can
indirectly achieve what it could not achieve directly, namely, termination of the Bikini-
ans constitutionally based claims); Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 219, at 19 (assert-
ing that congressional regulation of jurisdiction cannot be utilized to accomplish that
which Congress could not have done originally).
313. Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 910, n.35 (1984);
see id. (stating that almost all commentators agree that Congress, if allowed to with-
draw jurisdiction on a class of cases, cannot orchestrate cases or require court decisions
in disregard of the Constitution).
314. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968). The granted powers of Congress
are subject to constitutional limitation. Id.
315. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1871);
Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 219, at 19.
316. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d at 257.
317. Id. at 254.
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v. Klein.318 The Claims Court held these cases inapplicable on the basis
of factual differences.3 19 Both cases, however, were cited for the
breadth of their interrelated holdings.3 20 In Battaglia, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that Congress cannot rescind the
power of courts to hear a category of claims unless it can validly extin-
guish those claims. 21 In Klein, the Supreme Court held that Congress
cannot withdraw jurisdiction for an unconstitutional goal.32 2 These
cases, considered together, underscore the proposition that without an
adequate alternative resolution of these constitutional claims their dis-
missal would be an unconstitutional taking. 23
The Claims Court recognized the congressional ability to establish
adequate alternative resolution when it indicated that Congress could
establish constitutional alternative compensation. 24 The court, how-
ever, erroneously separated the idea of a forum from the constitutional-
ity of the compensation 25 The claims involved here are constitutional
claims 26 Therefore, without a constitutionally appropriate alternative
forum for compensation, Congress cannot validly dismiss these
claims. 327 Furthermore, a court cannot uphold the blanket dismissal of
318. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. at 128.
319. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 687. The court states that Klein was inappropriate
because it did not involve a complete withdrawal of the consent to sue of the substitu-
tion of an alternative compensation procedure. Id. The Claims Court distinguished Bat-
taglia on the grounds that it did not involve a congressional withdrawal of consent to
sue the United States and that the case involved only private parties. Id. at 688.
320. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 36-7.
321. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d at 257. Though Congress has the
power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of lower courts, it cannot exercise
that power to deprive life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to take
property without just compensation. Id. Given the broad sweep of the Battaglia pro-
nouncement and its Supreme Court precedent, it seems unlikely that the Court in-
tended to confine it solely to the facts of the case. The Battaglia court relied on
Graham & Foster v. Goodcell. Id. Graham & Foster stands for the proposition that
even if Congress possessed the power to dispense with this substantive right, it could
not do so through a blanket denial of remedy against the United States. Graham &
Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 439 (1931).
322. Klein v. United States, 80 U.S. at 146-47. Klein stressed that the congres-
sional withholding of appellate jurisdiction in order to restrain judicial review is an
unconstitutional exercise of power. Id. at 146-47.
323. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 687. A claim can be taken for the purposes of just
compensation. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 244-46 (1983),
afrd mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985). In
Shanghai, the Claims Court held that a lost claim, once extinguished by an executive
settlement, constituted property. Id. at 241.
324. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 689. Here, the alternative forum is the Claims Tribunal.
Id. The Section 177 Agreement established that the Tribunal administer the fund that
provides for compensation of the nuclear testing claims. Id.
325. Id. at 688-89.
326. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 669.
327. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968). Congress may not utilize consti-
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pending cases if such a result would violate due process, just compensa-
tion, or other constitutional provisions. 8
2. The Alternative Forum Is Not Constitutional
The constitutional test for alternative compensation provides that
when the state takes property for public use, there must be reasonable,
certain, and adequate means for acquiring compensation at the time of
the taking.329 The settlement based on the Section 177 Agreement330
and the Claims Tribunal established331 therein do not pass this test.3 32
The court asserted that it could not rule on the adequacy prong of the
constitutional test until the plaintiffs availed themselves to the Claims
Tribunal. 333 This is an incorrect result because it directly contradicts
the constitutional requirement that the means of compensation be ade-
quate at the time of taking.334
This alternative forum fails the constitutional test. Existing case law
requires the exhaustion of all other procedures before attempting reso-
lution in the courts. 335 Congress cannot, however, force this require-
tutionally granted powers in ways that violate other constitutional provisions. Id.; see
Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 39-40 (stating that the alternative procedure is
irrelevant unless it provides just compensation).
328. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.) cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48 (1871).
329. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974);
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railroad Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890).
330. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. II, § 2, at 4. The settlement
provides the Bikinians with $75 million as compensation for the losses sustained under
the nuclear testing program. Id. Congress will disburse the fund over a fifteen year
period. Id.
331. Id. The Claims Tribunal was established in the Section 177 Agreement to
dispense the money set aside for the settlement of claims arising from the nuclear test-
ing program. Id. $45.75 million is available to the Claims Tribunal for monetary
awards. Id. art. II, § 6, at 5. There is a cap on the annual awards to prevent early
exhaustion of the funds. Id.
332. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 124-25; see Juda
II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 689 (stating that the assertions of plaintiffs on the constitutionality of
the termination article are premature). The Claims Court stated that it could not yet
determine whether the settlement was "adequate." Id. The Claims Court fails to real-
ize that these constitutionally protected claims were "taken" upon the effectiveness of
the section 177 settlement. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 US. at
124-27. To ensure the constitutionality of the alternative, the court must look to the
time of the taking when determining the adequacy of compensation. Id. This alterna-
tive compensation was not "adequate" at the time of taking, therefore, it can not be
constitutional. Id.
333. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 689.
334. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 124-25 (quoting
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railroad Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)).
335. Consolidated Brief, supra note 15, at 49. In these cases, resort to a judicial
forum had always been retained as long as the procedure was capable of providing
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AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ment upon the Bikinians because the forum is constitutionally defec-
tive. 38 Consequently, the Section 177 Agreement blanket removal of
jurisdiction and the alternative remedy are both inadequate.33 7 The
court, however, held that the plaintiffs should resort to the alternative
forum. 3 38 Because this result is mistaken, the Claims Court erred in
dismissing the plaintiffs' case. After this latest obstacle in dealing with
the United States, the Bikinians would finally receive some
compensation.
C. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
DECISION
On September 27, 1988, President Reagan signed into law the Com-
pact of Free Association Act of 1988."'9 The Act provides that upon
voluntary dismissal of the Bikinian appeal to the Federal Circuit, pay-
ments for a $90 million Resettlement Trust Fund would begin.3 40 This
fund is intended to rehabilitate Bikini Atoll and resettle the Bikinian
people.341 On September 30, 1988, the Bikinians filed an unopposed
motion to dismiss pursuant to the prerequisites set forth in the Com-
pact of Free Association Act of 1988 for trust fund installments. 42 On
October 19, 1988, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted
the motion, ordering the appeal dismissed with prejudice.343
Although the Bikinian appeal was dismissed, the remaining appel-
meaningful relief. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1981); The Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. at 148. In the preceding cases, meaningful relief was possible through
the courts, while in the Bikinian's situation a judicial forum is unavailable. Juda II, 13
Cl. Ct. at 690.
336. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 124-25. This is an
unconstitutional forum, and, therefore, adequate assurances of just compensation are
lacking. Id. at 124.
337. See supra notes 306-30 and accompanying text (examining the constitutional
deficiencies of the Section 177 Agreement and the alternative forum).
338. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 689.
339. Compact of Free Association Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat.
1798 (1988).
340. Id. The 1988 act provides for installments in the Resettlement Trust Fund to
be carried out over a five year period. Id. The first installment for $5 million was
dispersed on October 1, 1988. Id.; see Appellant People of Bikini's Unopposed Motion
to Dismiss Appeal at 1-2, People of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utrik and other Mar-
shall Islands Atolls v. United States, (Fed. Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1206, 1207, 1208)
[hereinafter People of Bikini's Motion to Dismiss] (reiterating the conditions of the
Resettlement Trust Fund).
341. Compact of Free Association Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat.
1798 (1988).
342. People of Bikini's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 340, at 1.
343. People of Bikini v. United States, 859 F.2d 1482, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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lants proceeded with the suit.34 Adopting the analysis of the Claims
Court in Juda II, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed
the Claims Court decisions remaining on appeal. 345 On June 19, 1989,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the remaining appellants.-IG
The fact that the Bikinians were no longer parties to the suit did not
remedy misapplication of the provisions and legislative history of the
Compact.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States Claims Court decision and the affirmation of that
decision were erroneous. Building upon faulty analysis, the Claims
Court concluded that the Section 177 Agreement amended its Tucker
Act jurisdiction, and, subsequently, the court dismissed the com-
plaint.347 Prior to the denial of certiorari, the Supreme Court was in
the best position to reconcile this inequity.
The Supreme Court could have reversed and remanded the Court of
Appeals decision with the instructions that consistent with the language
and history of the Compact, section 103(g)(2) requires the courts to
determine the validity of Republic of the Marshall Islands espousal
before dismissing the claims. Under recognized principles of interna-
tional law," 8 the Republic of the Marshall Islands espousal is inade-
quate, and the remaining parties should proceed with their suit. In the
event the Supreme Court did not require valid espousal, constitutional
prerequisites would have necessitated the rejection of the Claims Court
dismissal as an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.3 9 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court could have ruled that the Section 177
claims settlement provision was ineffective and insufficient as an alter-
native forum.350
344. People of Enewetak v. United States, 864 F.2d 134 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The
cases of the remaining appellants were dismissed below for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. Id. at 135. The remaining appellants were consolidated from Peter v. United
States, 13 C. Ct. 691 (1987); and Nitol v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 690 (Fed. Cir.
1987). People of Enewetak v. United States, 864 F.2d 134, 135 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
345. People of Enewetak v. United States, 864 F.2d 134, 137 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
346. People of Enewetak v. United States, No. 88-1466 (U.S. June 19, 1989)
(WESTLAW, SCT database, 1989 WL 66054).
347. Juda II, 13 C. Ct. at 690; see supra notes 235-338 and accompanying text
(stating that the analysis of the Claims Court is faulty because the Compact and the
Section 177 Agreement are not in effect and that dismissal is unconstitutional).
348. See supra notes 258-305 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements
for valid espousal under international law).
349. See supra notes 329-38 and accompanying text (stating that Congressional
action cannot dismiss these claims without constitutionally adequate compensation).
350. See id. (asserting that the alternative forum is unconstitutional because it fails
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In light of the decision of the Supreme Court not to grant certiorari,
the legislative branch must act to alleviate the burden placed on the
Marshallese. Congress must amend the Compact to explicitly state that
section 103(g)(2) requires judicial determination of espousal validity.
In addition, while the Bikinians have received funds to clean their atoll,
other damages remain unsettled. Congress could simply settle the
claims of the Bikinians and the other Marshallese with monetary com-
pensation and alleviate the constitutional problems arising from the
Claims Tribunal.
CONCLUSION
After a forty year odyssey, enabling the United States to save bil-
lions on defense, the Claims Court dismissal of the Bikinian claims
makes these people just one of many groups vying for a share of United
States Government settlement funds.351 While Congress subsequently
enacted legislation to provide the Bikinians with funds to clean up their
atoll, the erroneous legal conclusions of the Claims Court, the Federal
Circuit's affirmation of them, and the Supreme Court's denial of certio-
rari remain. On a larger scale, these decisions have unjustifiably re-
moved the courts as an avenue for settlement of thousands of claims
arising from United States nuclear testing in Micronesia. 52 The legal
issues involved in Juda I and Juda II, though complicated, are clear
when the Compact is given its obvious meaning. Dismissal of these
claims and the subsequent affirmation of Juda II on appeal perpetuates
the history of United States neglect and abuse of the Bikinians and
other Marshallese who sacrificed their islands for the benefit of a su-
perpower. The legal conclusions in Juda II are erroneous. The Con-
gress must act if the United States is to rectify its past treatment of the
Bikinians.
to provide adequate compensation).
351. Section 177 Agreement, supra note 113, art. II, § 6, at 5. The claims adjudi-
cation funds, will provide $45.75 million over fifteen years for claims arising from the
nuclear testing program. Id.
352. Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 689-90. The Claims Court decision removed the consent
of the United States to suits on these issues. Id. at 690. In 1981 and 1982, fourteen
petitions representing 5000 Marshall Islands inhabitants were filed. Id. at 668.
[VOL.. 4:655
